Verify podman/docker images against locally stored signatures

Automate the verification of image signatures
Add an utility to retrieve manifest info
2025-05-19 11:40:36 +02:00 · 2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00 · 2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00 · 2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00 · 2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00 · 2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
38 changed files with 2420 additions and 652 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml
@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ jobs:
        id: cache-container-image
        uses: actions/cache@v4
        with:
-          key: v3-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/common.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/pixels_to_pdf.py', 'poetry.lock', 'gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py') }}
+          key: v4-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/*.py', 'dangerzone/container_helpers/*', 'install/common/build-image.py') }}
          path: |
            share/container.tar.gz
            share/image-id.txt
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
        id: cache-container-image
        uses: actions/cache@v4
        with:
-          key: v3-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/common.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/pixels_to_pdf.py', 'poetry.lock', 'gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py') }}
+          key: v4-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/*.py', 'dangerzone/container_helpers/*', 'install/common/build-image.py') }}
          path: |-
            share/container.tar.gz
            share/image-id.txt
@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Build Dangerzone container image
        if: ${{ steps.cache-container-image.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' }}
        run: |
-          sudo apt-get install -y python3-poetry
          python3 ./install/common/build-image.py

      - name: Upload container image
@ -227,7 +226,7 @@ jobs:
      - name: Restore container cache
        uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
        with:
-          key: v3-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/common.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/pixels_to_pdf.py', 'poetry.lock', 'gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py') }}
+          key: v4-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/*.py', 'dangerzone/container_helpers/*', 'install/common/build-image.py') }}
          path: |-
            share/container.tar.gz
            share/image-id.txt
@ -334,7 +333,7 @@ jobs:
      - name: Restore container image
        uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
        with:
-          key: v3-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/common.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/pixels_to_pdf.py', 'poetry.lock', 'gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py') }}
+          key: v4-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/*.py', 'dangerzone/container_helpers/*', 'install/common/build-image.py') }}
          path: |-
            share/container.tar.gz
            share/image-id.txt
@ -429,7 +428,7 @@ jobs:
      - name: Restore container image
        uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
        with:
-          key: v3-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/common.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py', 'dangerzone/conversion/pixels_to_pdf.py', 'poetry.lock', 'gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py') }}
+          key: v4-${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}-${{ hashFiles('Dockerfile', 'dangerzone/conversion/*.py', 'dangerzone/container_helpers/*', 'install/common/build-image.py') }}
          path: |-
            share/container.tar.gz
            share/image-id.txt
@ -472,3 +471,30 @@ jobs:
          #     file successfully.
          xvfb-run -s '-ac' ./dev_scripts/env.py --distro ${{ matrix.distro }} --version ${{ matrix.version }} run --dev \
              bash -c 'cd dangerzone; poetry run make test'
+
+  check-reproducibility:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Install dev. dependencies
+        run: |-
+          sudo apt-get update
+          sudo apt-get install -y git python3-poetry --no-install-recommends
+          poetry install --only package
+
+      - name: Verify that the Dockerfile matches the commited template and params
+        run: |-
+          cp Dockerfile Dockerfile.orig
+          make Dockerfile
+          diff Dockerfile.orig Dockerfile
+
+      - name: Build Dangerzone container image
+        run: |
+          python3 ./install/common/build-image.py --no-save
+
+      - name: Reproduce the same container image
+        run: |
+          ./dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
--- a/.github/workflows/release-container-image.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release-container-image.yml
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+name: Release container image
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - "container-image/**"
+    branches:
+      - "test/image-**"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  id-token: write
+  packages: write
+  contents: read
+  attestations: write
+
+env:
+  REGISTRY: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}
+  REGISTRY_USER: ${{ github.actor }}
+  REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ github.token }}
+  IMAGE_NAME: dangerzone/dangerzone
+
+jobs:
+  build-container-image:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
+        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        with:
+          registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
+          username: USERNAME
+          password: ${{ github.token }}
+
+      - name: Build and push the dangerzone image
+        id: build-image
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get install -y python3-poetry
+          python3 ./install/common/build-image.py
+          echo ${{ github.token }} | podman login ghcr.io -u USERNAME --password-stdin
+
+          # Load the image with the final name directly
+          gunzip -c share/container.tar.gz | podman load
+          FINAL_IMAGE_NAME="${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}"
+          TAG=$(git describe --long --first-parent | tail -c +2)
+          podman tag dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone:$TAG "$FINAL_IMAGE_NAME"
+          podman push "$FINAL_IMAGE_NAME" --digestfile=digest
+          echo "digest=$(cat digest)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Generate artifact attestation
+        uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v1
+        with:
+          subject-name: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}
+          subject-digest: "${{ steps.build-image.outputs.digest }}"
+          push-to-registry: true
--- a/.github/workflows/scan.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/scan.yml
@ -21,13 +21,17 @@ jobs:
          sudo apt install pipx
          pipx install poetry
          pipx inject poetry poetry-plugin-export
+          poetry install --only package
+      - name: Bump date of Debian snapshot archive
+        run: |
+          date=$(date "+%Y%m%d")
+          sed -i "s/DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=[0-9]\+/DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=${date}/" Dockerfile.env
+          make Dockerfile
      - name: Build container image
        run: python3 ./install/common/build-image.py --runtime docker --no-save
      - name: Get image tag
        id: tag
-        run: |
-          tag=$(docker images dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone --format '{{ .Tag }}')
-          echo "tag=$tag" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+        run: echo "tag=$(cat share/image-id.txt)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
      # NOTE: Scan first without failing, else we won't be able to read the scan
      # report.
      - name: Scan container image (no fail)
--- a/.grype.yaml
+++ b/.grype.yaml
@ -2,10 +2,38 @@
 # latest release of Dangerzone, and offer our analysis.

 ignore:
-  # CVE-2024-11053
+  # CVE-2023-45853
  # ==============
  #
-  # NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11053
-  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because libcurl is an HTTP client, and
-  # the Dangerzone container does not make any network calls.
-  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-11053
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-45853
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because the zlib library in Debian is
+  # built in a way that is not vulnerable.
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2023-45853
+  # CVE-2024-38428
+  # ==============
+  #
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-38428
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because it doesn't use wget in the
+  # container image (which also has no network connectivity).
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-38428
+  # CVE-2024-57823
+  # ==============
+  #
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-57823
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected. First things first, LibreOffice is
+  # using this library for parsing RDF metadata in a document [1], and has
+  # issued a fix for the vendored raptor2 package they have for other distros
+  # [2].
+  #
+  # On the other hand, the Debian security team has stated that this is a minor
+  # issue [3], and there's no fix from the developers yet. It seems that the
+  # Debian package is not affected somehow by this CVE, probably due to the way
+  # it's packaged.
+  #
+  # [1] https://wiki.documentfoundation.org/Documentation/DevGuide/Office_Development#RDF_metadata
+  # [2] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/libreoffice/core/commit/?id=2b50dc0e4482ac0ad27d69147b4175e05af4fba4
+  # [2] From https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-57823:
+  #
+  #       [bookworm] - raptor2 <postponed> (Minor issue, revisit when fixed upstream)
+  #
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-57823
--- a/BUILD.md
+++ b/BUILD.md
@ -515,3 +515,9 @@ poetry run .\install\windows\build-app.bat
 ```

 When you're done you will have `dist\Dangerzone.msi`.
+
+## Updating the container image
+
+The Dangezone container image is reproducible. This means that every time we
+build it, the result will be bit-for-bit the same, with some minor exceptions.
+Read more on how you can update it in `docs/developer/reproducibility.md`.
--- a/273
+++ b/273
@ -1,102 +1,211 @@
-###########################################
-# Build PyMuPDF
+# NOTE: Updating the packages to their latest versions requires bumping the
+# Dockerfile args below. For more info about this file, read
+# docs/developer/reproducibility.md.

-FROM alpine:latest as pymupdf-build
-ARG ARCH
-ARG REQUIREMENTS_TXT
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE=20250113

-# Install PyMuPDF via hash-checked requirements file
-COPY ${REQUIREMENTS_TXT} /tmp/requirements.txt
+FROM debian:bookworm-${DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}-slim as dangerzone-image

-# PyMuPDF provides non-arm musl wheels only.
-# Only install build-dependencies if we are actually building the wheel
-RUN case "$ARCH" in \
-    "arm64") \
-        # This is required for copying later, but is created only in the pre-built wheels
-        mkdir -p /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/PyMuPDF.libs/ \
-        && apk --no-cache add linux-headers g++ linux-headers gcc make python3-dev py3-pip clang-dev ;; \
-    *) \
-        apk --no-cache add py3-pip ;; \
-    esac
-RUN pip install -vv --break-system-packages --require-hashes -r /tmp/requirements.txt
+ARG GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250120
+ARG DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250127
+ARG H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM=7760dc2963332c50d15eee285933ec4b48d6a1de9e0c0f6082946f93090bd132
+ARG H2ORESTART_VERSION=v0.7.0

+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive

-###########################################
-# Download H2ORestart
-FROM alpine:latest as h2orestart-dl
-ARG H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM=d09bc5c93fe2483a7e4a57985d2a8d0e4efae2efb04375fe4b59a68afd7241e2
-RUN mkdir /libreoffice_ext && cd libreoffice_ext \
+# The following way of installing packages is taken from
+# https://github.com/reproducible-containers/repro-sources-list.sh/blob/master/Dockerfile.debian-12,
+# and adapted to allow installing gVisor from each own repo as well.
+RUN \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/cache/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/lib/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/repro-sources-list.sh,target=/usr/local/bin/repro-sources-list.sh \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/gvisor.key,target=/tmp/gvisor.key \
+  : "Hacky way to set a date for the Debian snapshot repos" && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list && \
+  repro-sources-list.sh && \
+  : "Setup APT to install gVisor from its separate APT repo" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get upgrade -y && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends apt-transport-https ca-certificates gnupg && \
+  gpg -o /usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg --dearmor /tmp/gvisor.key && \
+  echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases ${GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE} main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/gvisor.list && \
+  : "Install the necessary gVisor and Dangerzone dependencies" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      python3 python3-fitz libreoffice-nogui libreoffice-java-common \
+      python3 python3-magic default-jre-headless fonts-noto-cjk fonts-dejavu \
+      runsc unzip wget && \
+  : "Clean up for improving reproducibility (optional)" && \
+  rm -rf /var/cache/fontconfig/ && \
+  rm -rf /etc/ssl/certs/java/cacerts && \
+  rm -rf /var/log/* /var/cache/ldconfig/aux-cache
+
+# Download H2ORestart from GitHub using a pinned version and hash. Note that
+# it's available in Debian repos, but not in Bookworm yet.
+RUN mkdir /opt/libreoffice_ext && cd /opt/libreoffice_ext \
    && H2ORESTART_FILENAME=h2orestart.oxt \
-    && H2ORESTART_VERSION="v0.6.6" \
    && wget https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases/download/$H2ORESTART_VERSION/$H2ORESTART_FILENAME \
    && echo "$H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM  $H2ORESTART_FILENAME" | sha256sum -c \
-    && install -dm777 "/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/"
+    && install -dm777 "/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/" \
+    && rm /root/.wget-hsts

+# Create an unprivileged user both for gVisor and for running Dangerzone.
+RUN addgroup --gid 1000 dangerzone
+RUN adduser --uid 1000 --ingroup dangerzone --shell /bin/true \
+    --disabled-password --home /home/dangerzone dangerzone

-###########################################
-# Dangerzone image
-
-FROM alpine:latest AS dangerzone-image
-
-# Install dependencies
-RUN apk --no-cache -U upgrade && \
-    apk --no-cache add \
-    libreoffice \
-    openjdk8 \
-    python3 \
-    py3-magic \
-    font-noto-cjk
-
-COPY --from=pymupdf-build /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fitz/ /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/fitz
-COPY --from=pymupdf-build /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pymupdf/ /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pymupdf
-COPY --from=pymupdf-build /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/PyMuPDF.libs/ /usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/PyMuPDF.libs
-COPY --from=h2orestart-dl /libreoffice_ext/ /libreoffice_ext
-
-RUN install -dm777 "/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/"
-
+# Copy Dangerzone's conversion logic under /opt/dangerzone, and allow Python to
+# import it.
 RUN mkdir -p /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone
 RUN touch /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/__init__.py
-COPY conversion /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/conversion

-# Add the unprivileged user. Set the UID/GID of the dangerzone user/group to
-# 1000, since we will point to it from the OCI config.
-#
-# NOTE: A tmpfs will be mounted over /home/dangerzone directory,
-# so nothing within it from the image will be persisted.
-RUN addgroup -g 1000 dangerzone && \
-    adduser -u 1000 -s /bin/true -G dangerzone -h /home/dangerzone -D dangerzone
-
-###########################################
-# gVisor wrapper image
-
-FROM alpine:latest
-
-RUN apk --no-cache -U upgrade && \
-    apk --no-cache add python3
-
-RUN GVISOR_URL="https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases/release/latest/$(uname -m)"; \
-    wget "${GVISOR_URL}/runsc" "${GVISOR_URL}/runsc.sha512" && \
-    sha512sum -c runsc.sha512 && \
-    rm -f runsc.sha512 && \
-    chmod 555 runsc && \
-    mv runsc /usr/bin/
-
-# Add the unprivileged `dangerzone` user.
-RUN addgroup dangerzone && \
-    adduser -s /bin/true -G dangerzone -h /home/dangerzone -D dangerzone
-
-# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
-USER dangerzone
-
-# Copy the Dangerzone image, as created by the previous steps, into the home
-# directory of the `dangerzone` user.
-RUN mkdir /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image
-COPY --from=dangerzone-image / /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs
+# Copy only the Python code, and not any produced .pyc files.
+COPY conversion/*.py /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/conversion/

 # Create a directory that will be used by gVisor as the place where it will
 # store the state of its containers.
 RUN mkdir /home/dangerzone/.containers

-COPY gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py /
+###############################################################################
+#
+#                       REUSING CONTAINER IMAGES:
+#                          Anatomy of a hack
+#                       ========================
+#
+# The rest of the Dockerfile aims to do one thing: allow the final container
+# image to actually contain two container images; one for the outer container
+# (spawned by Podman/Docker Desktop), and one for the inner container (spawned
+# by gVisor).
+#
+# This has already been done in the past, and we explain why and how in the
+# design document for gVisor integration (should be in
+# `docs/developer/gvisor.md`). In this iteration, we want to also
+# achieve the following:
+#
+# 1. Have a small final image, by sharing some system paths between the inner
+#    and outer container image using symlinks.
+# 2. Allow our security scanning tool to see the contents of the inner
+#    container image.
+# 3. Make the outer container image operational, in the sense that you can use
+#    `apt` commands and perform a conversion with Dangerzone, outside the
+#    gVisor sandbox. This is helpful for debugging purposes.
+#
+# Below we'll explain how our design choices are informed by the above
+# sub-goals.
+#
+# First, to achieve a small container image, we basically need to copy `/etc`,
+# `/usr` and `/opt` from the original Dangerzone image to the **inner**
+# container image (under `/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/`)
+#
+# That's all we need. The rest of the files play no role, and we can actually
+# mask them in gVisor's OCI config.
+#
+# Second, in order to let our security scanner find the installed packages,
+# we need to copy the following dirs to the root of the **outer** container
+# image:
+# * `/etc`, so that the security scanner can detect the image type and its
+#   sources
+# * `/var`, so that the security scanner can have access to the APT database.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: We don't symlink the `/etc` of the **outer** container image to
+# the **inner** one, in order to avoid leaking files like
+# `/etc/{hostname,hosts,resolv.conf}` that Podman/Docker mounts when running
+# the **outer** container image.
+#
+# Third, in order to have an operational Debian image, we are _mostly_ covered
+# by the dirs we have copied. There's a _rare_ case where during debugging, we
+# may want to install a system package that has components in `/etc` and
+# `/var`, which will not be available in the **inner** container image. In that
+# case, the developer can do the necessary symlinks in the live container.
+#
+#                           FILESYSTEM HIERARCHY
+#                           ====================
+#
+# The above plan leads to the following filesystem hierarchy:
+#
+# Outer container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 bin -> usr/bin
+#     -rwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    7764 Jan 24 08:14 entrypoint.py
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 etc
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 home
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       9 Jan 27 10:46 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 root
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 run
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       8 Jan 27 10:46 sbin -> usr/sbin
+#     drwxrwxrwx   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 tmp
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root      44 Jan 27 10:46 usr -> /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr
+#     drwxr-xr-x  11 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 var
+#
+# Inner container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/
+#     total 12
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 bin -> usr/bin
+#     drwxr-xr-x 43 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:46 etc
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Jan 27 10:47 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 opt
+#     drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 usr
+#
+#                           SYMLINKING /USR
+#                           ===============
+#
+# It's surprisingly difficult (maybe even borderline impossible), to symlink
+# `/usr` to a different path during image build. The problem is that /usr
+# is very sensitive, and you can't manipulate it in a live system. That is, I
+# haven't found a way to do the following, or something equivalent:
+#
+#    rm -r /usr && ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/ /usr
+#
+# The `ln` binary, even if you specify it by its full path, cannot run
+# (probably because `ld-linux.so` can't be found). For this reason, we have
+# to create the symlinks beforehand, in a previous build stage. Then, in an
+# empty contianer image (scratch images), we can copy these symlinks and the
+# /usr, and stich everything together.
+###############################################################################
+
+# Create the filesystem hierarchy that will be used to symlink /usr.
+
+RUN mkdir /new_root
+RUN mkdir /new_root/root /new_root/run /new_root/tmp
+RUN chmod 777 /new_root/tmp
+RUN ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr /new_root/usr
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /new_root/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /new_root/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /new_root/lib64
+RUN ln -s usr/sbin /new_root/sbin
+
+## Final image
+
+FROM scratch
+
+# Copy the filesystem hierarchy that we created in the previous stage, so that
+# /usr can be a symlink.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /new_root/ /
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to run Dangerzone in the inner container image.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /opt/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/opt/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /usr/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib64
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to let the security scanner find vulnerabilities.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /var/ /var/
+
+# Allow our entrypoint script to make changes in the following folders.
+RUN chown dangerzone:dangerzone /home/dangerzone /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/
+
+# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
+USER dangerzone
+
+COPY container_helpers/entrypoint.py /

 ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.py"]
--- a/Dockerfile.env
+++ b/Dockerfile.env
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Can be bumped to the latest date in https://hub.docker.com/_/debian/tags?name=bookworm-
+DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE=20250113
+# Can be bumped to today's date
+DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250127
+# Can be bumped to the latest date in https://github.com/google/gvisor/tags
+GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250120
+# Can be bumped to the latest version and checksum from https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases
+H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM=7760dc2963332c50d15eee285933ec4b48d6a1de9e0c0f6082946f93090bd132
+H2ORESTART_VERSION=v0.7.0
--- a/Dockerfile.in
+++ b/Dockerfile.in
@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# NOTE: Updating the packages to their latest versions requires bumping the
+# Dockerfile args below. For more info about this file, read
+# docs/developer/reproducibility.md.
+
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE={{DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}}
+
+FROM debian:bookworm-${DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}-slim as dangerzone-image
+
+ARG GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE={{GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE}}
+ARG DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE={{DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE}}
+ARG H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM={{H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM}}
+ARG H2ORESTART_VERSION={{H2ORESTART_VERSION}}
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+# The following way of installing packages is taken from
+# https://github.com/reproducible-containers/repro-sources-list.sh/blob/master/Dockerfile.debian-12,
+# and adapted to allow installing gVisor from each own repo as well.
+RUN \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/cache/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/lib/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/repro-sources-list.sh,target=/usr/local/bin/repro-sources-list.sh \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/gvisor.key,target=/tmp/gvisor.key \
+  : "Hacky way to set a date for the Debian snapshot repos" && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list && \
+  repro-sources-list.sh && \
+  : "Setup APT to install gVisor from its separate APT repo" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get upgrade -y && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends apt-transport-https ca-certificates gnupg && \
+  gpg -o /usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg --dearmor /tmp/gvisor.key && \
+  echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases ${GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE} main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/gvisor.list && \
+  : "Install the necessary gVisor and Dangerzone dependencies" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      python3 python3-fitz libreoffice-nogui libreoffice-java-common \
+      python3 python3-magic default-jre-headless fonts-noto-cjk fonts-dejavu \
+      runsc unzip wget && \
+  : "Clean up for improving reproducibility (optional)" && \
+  rm -rf /var/cache/fontconfig/ && \
+  rm -rf /etc/ssl/certs/java/cacerts && \
+  rm -rf /var/log/* /var/cache/ldconfig/aux-cache
+
+# Download H2ORestart from GitHub using a pinned version and hash. Note that
+# it's available in Debian repos, but not in Bookworm yet.
+RUN mkdir /opt/libreoffice_ext && cd /opt/libreoffice_ext \
+    && H2ORESTART_FILENAME=h2orestart.oxt \
+    && wget https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases/download/$H2ORESTART_VERSION/$H2ORESTART_FILENAME \
+    && echo "$H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM  $H2ORESTART_FILENAME" | sha256sum -c \
+    && install -dm777 "/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/" \
+    && rm /root/.wget-hsts
+
+# Create an unprivileged user both for gVisor and for running Dangerzone.
+RUN addgroup --gid 1000 dangerzone
+RUN adduser --uid 1000 --ingroup dangerzone --shell /bin/true \
+    --disabled-password --home /home/dangerzone dangerzone
+
+# Copy Dangerzone's conversion logic under /opt/dangerzone, and allow Python to
+# import it.
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone
+RUN touch /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/__init__.py
+
+# Copy only the Python code, and not any produced .pyc files.
+COPY conversion/*.py /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/conversion/
+
+# Create a directory that will be used by gVisor as the place where it will
+# store the state of its containers.
+RUN mkdir /home/dangerzone/.containers
+
+###############################################################################
+#
+#                       REUSING CONTAINER IMAGES:
+#                          Anatomy of a hack
+#                       ========================
+#
+# The rest of the Dockerfile aims to do one thing: allow the final container
+# image to actually contain two container images; one for the outer container
+# (spawned by Podman/Docker Desktop), and one for the inner container (spawned
+# by gVisor).
+#
+# This has already been done in the past, and we explain why and how in the
+# design document for gVisor integration (should be in
+# `docs/developer/gvisor.md`). In this iteration, we want to also
+# achieve the following:
+#
+# 1. Have a small final image, by sharing some system paths between the inner
+#    and outer container image using symlinks.
+# 2. Allow our security scanning tool to see the contents of the inner
+#    container image.
+# 3. Make the outer container image operational, in the sense that you can use
+#    `apt` commands and perform a conversion with Dangerzone, outside the
+#    gVisor sandbox. This is helpful for debugging purposes.
+#
+# Below we'll explain how our design choices are informed by the above
+# sub-goals.
+#
+# First, to achieve a small container image, we basically need to copy `/etc`,
+# `/usr` and `/opt` from the original Dangerzone image to the **inner**
+# container image (under `/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/`)
+#
+# That's all we need. The rest of the files play no role, and we can actually
+# mask them in gVisor's OCI config.
+#
+# Second, in order to let our security scanner find the installed packages,
+# we need to copy the following dirs to the root of the **outer** container
+# image:
+# * `/etc`, so that the security scanner can detect the image type and its
+#   sources
+# * `/var`, so that the security scanner can have access to the APT database.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: We don't symlink the `/etc` of the **outer** container image to
+# the **inner** one, in order to avoid leaking files like
+# `/etc/{hostname,hosts,resolv.conf}` that Podman/Docker mounts when running
+# the **outer** container image.
+#
+# Third, in order to have an operational Debian image, we are _mostly_ covered
+# by the dirs we have copied. There's a _rare_ case where during debugging, we
+# may want to install a system package that has components in `/etc` and
+# `/var`, which will not be available in the **inner** container image. In that
+# case, the developer can do the necessary symlinks in the live container.
+#
+#                           FILESYSTEM HIERARCHY
+#                           ====================
+#
+# The above plan leads to the following filesystem hierarchy:
+#
+# Outer container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 bin -> usr/bin
+#     -rwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    7764 Jan 24 08:14 entrypoint.py
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 etc
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 home
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       9 Jan 27 10:46 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 root
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 run
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       8 Jan 27 10:46 sbin -> usr/sbin
+#     drwxrwxrwx   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 tmp
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root      44 Jan 27 10:46 usr -> /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr
+#     drwxr-xr-x  11 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 var
+#
+# Inner container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/
+#     total 12
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 bin -> usr/bin
+#     drwxr-xr-x 43 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:46 etc
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Jan 27 10:47 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 opt
+#     drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 usr
+#
+#                           SYMLINKING /USR
+#                           ===============
+#
+# It's surprisingly difficult (maybe even borderline impossible), to symlink
+# `/usr` to a different path during image build. The problem is that /usr
+# is very sensitive, and you can't manipulate it in a live system. That is, I
+# haven't found a way to do the following, or something equivalent:
+#
+#    rm -r /usr && ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/ /usr
+#
+# The `ln` binary, even if you specify it by its full path, cannot run
+# (probably because `ld-linux.so` can't be found). For this reason, we have
+# to create the symlinks beforehand, in a previous build stage. Then, in an
+# empty contianer image (scratch images), we can copy these symlinks and the
+# /usr, and stich everything together.
+###############################################################################
+
+# Create the filesystem hierarchy that will be used to symlink /usr.
+
+RUN mkdir /new_root
+RUN mkdir /new_root/root /new_root/run /new_root/tmp
+RUN chmod 777 /new_root/tmp
+RUN ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr /new_root/usr
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /new_root/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /new_root/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /new_root/lib64
+RUN ln -s usr/sbin /new_root/sbin
+
+## Final image
+
+FROM scratch
+
+# Copy the filesystem hierarchy that we created in the previous stage, so that
+# /usr can be a symlink.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /new_root/ /
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to run Dangerzone in the inner container image.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /opt/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/opt/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /usr/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib64
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to let the security scanner find vulnerabilities.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /var/ /var/
+
+# Allow our entrypoint script to make changes in the following folders.
+RUN chown dangerzone:dangerzone /home/dangerzone /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/
+
+# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
+USER dangerzone
+
+COPY container_helpers/entrypoint.py /
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.py"]
--- a/3
+++ b/3
@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ test-large: test-large-init  ## Run large test set
 	python -m pytest --tb=no tests/test_large_set.py::TestLargeSet -v $(JUNIT_FLAGS) --junitxml=$(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)
 	python $(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)/report.py $(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)

+Dockerfile: Dockerfile.env Dockerfile.in
+	poetry run jinja2 Dockerfile.in Dockerfile.env > Dockerfile
+
 .PHONY: build-clean
 build-clean:
 	doit clean
--- a/RELEASE.md
+++ b/RELEASE.md
@ -8,12 +8,14 @@ Here is a list of tasks that should be done before issuing the release:

 - [ ] Create a new issue named **QA and Release for version \<VERSION\>**, to track the general progress.
      You can generate its content with the the `poetry run ./dev_scripts/generate-release-tasks.py` command.
- [ ] [Add new Linux platforms and remove obsolete ones](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/blob/main/RELEASE.md#add-new-platforms-and-remove-obsolete-ones)
+- [ ] [Add new Linux platforms and remove obsolete ones](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/blob/main/RELEASE.md#add-new-linux-platforms-and-remove-obsolete-ones)
 - [ ] Bump the Python dependencies using `poetry lock`
 - [ ] Update `version` in `pyproject.toml`
 - [ ] Update `share/version.txt`
 - [ ] Update the "Version" field in `install/linux/dangerzone.spec`
 - [ ] Bump the Debian version by adding a new changelog entry in `debian/changelog`
+- [ ] [Bump the minimum Docker Desktop versions](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/blob/main/RELEASE.md#bump-the-minimum-docker-desktop-version) in `isolation_provider/container.py`
+- [ ] Bump the dates and versions in the `Dockerfile`
 - [ ] Update screenshot in `README.md`, if necessary
 - [ ] CHANGELOG.md should be updated to include a list of all major changes since the last release
 - [ ] A draft release should be created. Copy the release notes text from the template at [`docs/templates/release-notes`](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/tree/main/docs/templates/)
@ -46,6 +48,12 @@ In case of the removal of a version:
   * Consult the previous paragraph, but also `grep` your way around.
 2. Add a notice in our `CHANGELOG.md` about the version removal.

+## Bump the minimum Docker Desktop version
+
+We embed the minimum docker desktop versions inside Dangerzone, as an incentive for our macOS and Windows users to upgrade to the latests version.
+
+You can find the latest version at the time of the release by looking at [their release notes](https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/)
+
 ## Large Document Testing

 Parallel to the QA process, the release candidate should be put through the large document tests in a dedicated machine to run overnight.
--- a/14
+++ b/14
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+This project includes third-party components as follows:
+
+1. gVisor APT Key
+   - URL: https://gvisor.dev/archive.key
+   - Last updated: 2025-01-21
+   - Description: This is the public key used for verifying packages from the gVisor repository.
+
+2. Reproducible Containers Helper Script
+   - URL: https://github.com/reproducible-containers/repro-sources-list.sh/blob/d15cf12b26395b857b24fba223b108aff1c91b26/repro-sources-list.sh
+   - Last updated: 2025-01-21
+   - Description: This script is used for building reproducible Debian images.
+
+Please refer to the respective sources for licensing information and further details regarding the use of these components.
+
--- a/dangerzone/cli.py
+++ b/dangerzone/cli.py
@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ def display_banner() -> None:
        + Back.BLACK
        + Fore.LIGHTWHITE_EX
        + Style.BRIGHT
-        + f"{' '*left_spaces}Dangerzone v{get_version()}{' '*right_spaces}"
+        + f"{' ' * left_spaces}Dangerzone v{get_version()}{' ' * right_spaces}"
        + Fore.YELLOW
        + Style.DIM
        + "│"
--- a/dangerzone/container_helpers/entrypoint.py
+++ b/dangerzone/container_helpers/entrypoint.py
@ -59,10 +59,28 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
    "root": {"path": "rootfs", "readonly": True},
    "hostname": "dangerzone",
    "mounts": [
+        # Mask almost every system directory of the outer container, by mounting tmpfs
+        # on top of them. This is done to avoid leaking any sensitive information,
+        # either mounted by Podman/Docker, or when gVisor runs, since we reuse the same
+        # rootfs. We basically mask everything except for `/usr`, `/bin`, `/lib`,
+        # `/etc`, and `/opt`.
+        #
+        # Note that we set `--root /home/dangerzone/.containers` for the directory where
+        # gVisor will create files at runtime, which means that in principle, we are
+        # covered by the masking of `/home/dangerzone` that follows below.
+        #
+        # Finally, note that the following list has been taken from the dirs in our
+        # container image, and double-checked against the top-level dirs listed in the
+        # Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) [1]. It would be nice to have an allowlist
+        # approach instead of a denylist, but FHS is such an old standard that we don't
+        # expect any new top-level dirs to pop up any time soon.
+        #
+        # [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filesystem_Hierarchy_Standard
        {
-            "destination": "/proc",
-            "type": "proc",
-            "source": "proc",
+            "destination": "/boot",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
        },
        {
            "destination": "/dev",
@ -70,6 +88,53 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
            "source": "tmpfs",
            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/home",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/media",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/mnt",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/proc",
+            "type": "proc",
+            "source": "proc",
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/root",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/run",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/sbin",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/srv",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
        {
            "destination": "/sys",
            "type": "tmpfs",
@ -82,6 +147,12 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
            "source": "tmpfs",
            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/var",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
+        },
        # LibreOffice needs a writable home directory, so just mount a tmpfs
        # over it.
        {
--- a/dangerzone/container_helpers/gvisor.key
+++ b/dangerzone/container_helpers/gvisor.key
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+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+=5/8T
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
--- a/dangerzone/container_helpers/repro-sources-list.sh
+++ b/dangerzone/container_helpers/repro-sources-list.sh
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+#   Copyright The repro-sources-list.sh Authors.
+#
+#   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+#   you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+#   You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+#   Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+#   distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+#   WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+#   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+#   limitations under the License.
+
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# repro-sources-list.sh:
+# configures /etc/apt/sources.list and similar files for installing packages from a snapshot.
+#
+# This script is expected to be executed inside Dockerfile.
+#
+# The following distributions are supported:
+# - debian:11    (/etc/apt/sources.list)
+# - debian:12    (/etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources)
+# - ubuntu:22.04 (/etc/apt/sources.list)
+# - ubuntu:24.04 (/etc/apt/sources.listd/ubuntu.sources)
+# - archlinux    (/etc/pacman.d/mirrorlist)
+#
+# For the further information, see https://github.com/reproducible-containers/repro-sources-list.sh
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+set -eux -o pipefail
+
+. /etc/os-release
+
+: "${KEEP_CACHE:=1}"
+
+keep_apt_cache() {
+	rm -f /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/docker-clean
+	echo 'Binary::apt::APT::Keep-Downloaded-Packages "true";' >/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/keep-cache
+}
+
+case "${ID}" in
+"debian")
+	: "${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE:=http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/}"
+	: "${BACKPORTS:=}"
+	if [ -e /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources ]; then
+		: "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=$(stat --format=%Y /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources)}"
+		rm -f /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
+	else
+		: "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=$(stat --format=%Y /etc/apt/sources.list)}"
+	fi
+	snapshot="$(printf "%(%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)T\n" "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}")"
+	# TODO: use the new format for Debian >= 12
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}debian/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME} main" >/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}debian-security/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-security main" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}debian/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-updates main" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	if [ "${BACKPORTS}" = 1 ]; then echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}debian/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-backports main" >>/etc/apt/sources.list; fi
+	if [ "${KEEP_CACHE}" = 1 ]; then keep_apt_cache; fi
+	;;
+"ubuntu")
+	: "${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE:=http://snapshot.ubuntu.com/}"
+	if [ -e /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ubuntu.sources ]; then
+		: "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=$(stat --format=%Y /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ubuntu.sources)}"
+		rm -f /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ubuntu.sources
+	else
+		: "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=$(stat --format=%Y /etc/apt/sources.list)}"
+	fi
+	snapshot="$(printf "%(%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)T\n" "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}")"
+	# TODO: use the new format for Ubuntu >= 24.04
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME} main restricted" >/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-updates main restricted" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME} universe" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-updates universe" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME} multiverse" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-updates multiverse" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-backports main restricted universe multiverse" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-security main restricted" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-security universe" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	echo "deb [check-valid-until=no] ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}ubuntu/${snapshot} ${VERSION_CODENAME}-security multiverse" >>/etc/apt/sources.list
+	if [ "${KEEP_CACHE}" = 1 ]; then keep_apt_cache; fi
+	# http://snapshot.ubuntu.com is redirected to https, so we have to install ca-certificates
+	export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+	apt-get -o Acquire::https::Verify-Peer=false update >&2
+	apt-get -o Acquire::https::Verify-Peer=false install -y ca-certificates >&2
+	;;
+"arch")
+	: "${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE:=http://archive.archlinux.org/}"
+	: "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=$(stat --format=%Y /var/log/pacman.log)}"
+	export SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2016
+	date -d "@${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}" "+Server = ${SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_BASE}repos/%Y/%m/%d/\$repo/os/\$arch" >/etc/pacman.d/mirrorlist
+	;;
+*)
+	echo >&2 "Unsupported distribution: ${ID}"
+	exit 1
+	;;
+esac
+
+: "${WRITE_SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:=/dev/null}"
+echo "${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}" >"${WRITE_SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}"
+echo "SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH}"
--- a/dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py
+++ b/dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py
@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ class DocumentToPixels(DangerzoneConverter):
            # At least .odt, .docx, .odg, .odp, .ods, and .pptx
            "application/zip": {
                "type": "libreoffice",
+                # NOTE: `file` command < 5.45 cannot detect hwpx files properly, so we
+                # enable the extension in any case. See also:
+                # https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/pull/460#issuecomment-1654166465
+                "libreoffice_ext": "h2orestart.oxt",
            },
            # At least .doc, .docx, .odg, .odp, .odt, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, .xls, and .xlsx
            "application/octet-stream": {
@ -249,7 +253,7 @@ class DocumentToPixels(DangerzoneConverter):
            "unzip",
            "-d",
            f"/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/{libreoffice_ext}/",
-            f"/libreoffice_ext/{libreoffice_ext}",
+            f"/opt/libreoffice_ext/{libreoffice_ext}",
        ]
        await self.run_command(
            unzip_args,
--- a/dangerzone/gui/main_window.py
+++ b/dangerzone/gui/main_window.py
@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ class MainWindow(QtWidgets.QMainWindow):

        self.setWindowTitle("Dangerzone")
        self.setWindowIcon(self.dangerzone.get_window_icon())
+        self.alert: Optional[Alert] = None

        self.setMinimumWidth(600)
        if platform.system() == "Darwin":
@ -226,6 +227,13 @@ class MainWindow(QtWidgets.QMainWindow):
        # This allows us to make QSS rules conditional on the OS color mode.
        self.setProperty("OSColorMode", self.dangerzone.app.os_color_mode.value)

+        if hasattr(self.dangerzone.isolation_provider, "check_docker_desktop_version"):
+            is_version_valid, version = (
+                self.dangerzone.isolation_provider.check_docker_desktop_version()
+            )
+            if not is_version_valid:
+                self.handle_docker_desktop_version_check(is_version_valid, version)
+
        self.show()

    def show_update_success(self) -> None:
@ -279,6 +287,46 @@ class MainWindow(QtWidgets.QMainWindow):
        self.dangerzone.settings.set("updater_check", check)
        self.dangerzone.settings.save()

+    def handle_docker_desktop_version_check(
+        self, is_version_valid: bool, version: str
+    ) -> None:
+        hamburger_menu = self.hamburger_button.menu()
+        sep = hamburger_menu.insertSeparator(hamburger_menu.actions()[0])
+        upgrade_action = QAction("Docker Desktop should be upgraded", hamburger_menu)
+        upgrade_action.setIcon(
+            QtGui.QIcon(
+                load_svg_image(
+                    "hamburger_menu_update_dot_error.svg", width=64, height=64
+                )
+            )
+        )
+
+        message = """
+        <p>A new version of Docker Desktop is available. Please upgrade your system.</p>
+        <p>Visit the <a href="https://www.docker.com/products/docker-desktop">Docker Desktop website</a> to download the latest version.</p>
+        <em>Keeping Docker Desktop up to date allows you to have more confidence that your documents are processed safely.</em>
+        """
+        self.alert = Alert(
+            self.dangerzone,
+            title="Upgrade Docker Desktop",
+            message=message,
+            ok_text="Ok",
+            has_cancel=False,
+        )
+
+        def _launch_alert() -> None:
+            if self.alert:
+                self.alert.launch()
+
+        upgrade_action.triggered.connect(_launch_alert)
+        hamburger_menu.insertAction(sep, upgrade_action)
+
+        self.hamburger_button.setIcon(
+            QtGui.QIcon(
+                load_svg_image("hamburger_menu_update_error.svg", width=64, height=64)
+            )
+        )
+
    def handle_updates(self, report: UpdateReport) -> None:
        """Handle update reports from the update checker thread.

@ -365,7 +413,7 @@ class MainWindow(QtWidgets.QMainWindow):
        self.content_widget.show()

    def closeEvent(self, e: QtGui.QCloseEvent) -> None:
-        alert_widget = Alert(
+        self.alert = Alert(
            self.dangerzone,
            message="Some documents are still being converted.\n Are you sure you want to quit?",
            ok_text="Abort conversions",
@ -379,7 +427,7 @@ class MainWindow(QtWidgets.QMainWindow):
            else:
                self.dangerzone.app.exit(0)
        else:
-            accept_exit = alert_widget.launch()
+            accept_exit = self.alert.launch()
            if not accept_exit:
                e.ignore()
                return
@ -623,7 +671,7 @@ class ContentWidget(QtWidgets.QWidget):

    def documents_selected(self, docs: List[Document]) -> None:
        if self.conversion_started:
-            Alert(
+            self.alert = Alert(
                self.dangerzone,
                message="Dangerzone does not support adding documents after the conversion has started.",
                has_cancel=False,
@ -633,7 +681,7 @@ class ContentWidget(QtWidgets.QWidget):
        # Ensure all files in batch are in the same directory
        dirnames = {os.path.dirname(doc.input_filename) for doc in docs}
        if len(dirnames) > 1:
-            Alert(
+            self.alert = Alert(
                self.dangerzone,
                message="Dangerzone does not support adding documents from multiple locations.\n\n The newly added documents were ignored.",
                has_cancel=False,
@ -802,14 +850,14 @@ class DocSelectionDropFrame(QtWidgets.QFrame):
            text = f"{num_unsupported_docs} files are not supported."
            ok_text = "Continue without these files"

-        alert_widget = Alert(
+        self.alert = Alert(
            self.dangerzone,
            message=f"{text}\nThe supported extensions are: "
            + ", ".join(get_supported_extensions()),
            ok_text=ok_text,
        )

-        return alert_widget.exec_()
+        return self.alert.exec_()


 class SettingsWidget(QtWidgets.QWidget):
--- a/dangerzone/isolation_provider/base.py
+++ b/dangerzone/isolation_provider/base.py
@ -335,9 +335,9 @@ class IsolationProvider(ABC):
        stderr_thread = self.start_stderr_thread(p, stderr)

        if platform.system() != "Windows":
-            assert os.getpgid(p.pid) != os.getpgid(
-                os.getpid()
-            ), "Parent shares same PGID with child"
+            assert os.getpgid(p.pid) != os.getpgid(os.getpid()), (
+                "Parent shares same PGID with child"
+            )

        try:
            yield p
--- a/dangerzone/isolation_provider/container.py
+++ b/dangerzone/isolation_provider/container.py
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import os
 import platform
 import shlex
 import subprocess
-from typing import List
+from typing import List, Tuple

 from .. import container_utils, errors
 from ..document import Document
@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ from ..util import get_resource_path, get_subprocess_startupinfo
 from .base import IsolationProvider, terminate_process_group

 TIMEOUT_KILL = 5  # Timeout in seconds until the kill command returns.
-
+MINIMUM_DOCKER_DESKTOP = {
+    "Darwin": "4.36.0",
+    "Windows": "4.36.0",
+}

 # Define startupinfo for subprocesses
 if platform.system() == "Windows":
@ -121,6 +124,7 @@ class Container(IsolationProvider):
    def is_available() -> bool:
        container_runtime = container_utils.get_runtime()
        runtime_name = container_utils.get_runtime_name()
+
        # Can we run `docker/podman image ls` without an error
        with subprocess.Popen(
            [container_runtime, "image", "ls"],
@ -135,6 +139,28 @@ class Container(IsolationProvider):
                )
            return True

+    def check_docker_desktop_version(self) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
+        # On windows and darwin, check that the minimum version is met
+        version = ""
+        if platform.system() != "Linux":
+            with subprocess.Popen(
+                ["docker", "version", "--format", "{{.Server.Platform.Name}}"],
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+                startupinfo=get_subprocess_startupinfo(),
+            ) as p:
+                stdout, stderr = p.communicate()
+                if p.returncode != 0:
+                    # When an error occurs, consider that the check went
+                    # through, as we're checking for installation compatibiliy
+                    # somewhere else already
+                    return True, version
+                # The output is like "Docker Desktop 4.35.1 (173168)"
+                version = stdout.decode().replace("Docker Desktop", "").split()[0]
+                if version < MINIMUM_DOCKER_DESKTOP[platform.system()]:
+                    return False, version
+        return True, version
+
    def doc_to_pixels_container_name(self, document: Document) -> str:
        """Unique container name for the doc-to-pixels phase."""
        return f"dangerzone-doc-to-pixels-{document.id}"
--- a/dangerzone/util.py
+++ b/dangerzone/util.py
@ -5,11 +5,14 @@ import sys
 import traceback
 import unicodedata

-import appdirs
+try:
+    import platformdirs
+except ImportError:
+    import appdirs as platformdirs


 def get_config_dir() -> str:
-    return appdirs.user_config_dir("dangerzone")
+    return platformdirs.user_config_dir("dangerzone")


 def get_resource_path(filename: str) -> str:
--- a/debian/control
+++ b/debian/control
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Rules-Requires-Root: no

 Package: dangerzone
 Architecture: any
-Depends: ${misc:Depends}, ${python3:Depends}, podman, python3, python3-pyside2.qtcore, python3-pyside2.qtgui, python3-pyside2.qtwidgets, python3-pyside2.qtsvg, python3-appdirs, python3-click, python3-xdg, python3-colorama, python3-requests, python3-markdown, python3-packaging, tesseract-ocr-all
+Depends: ${misc:Depends}, podman, python3, python3-pyside2.qtcore, python3-pyside2.qtgui, python3-pyside2.qtwidgets, python3-pyside2.qtsvg, python3-platformdirs | python3-appdirs, python3-click, python3-xdg, python3-colorama, python3-requests, python3-markdown, python3-packaging, tesseract-ocr-all
 Description: Take potentially dangerous PDFs, office documents, or images
  Dangerzone is an open source desktop application that takes potentially dangerous PDFs, office documents, or images and converts them to safe PDFs. It uses disposable VMs on Qubes OS, or container technology in other OSes, to convert the documents within a secure sandbox.
  .
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ export DH_VERBOSE=1
 	dh $@ --with python3 --buildsystem=pybuild

 override_dh_builddeb:
-	./install/linux/vendor-pymupdf.py --dest debian/dangerzone/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/dangerzone/vendor/
+	./install/linux/debian-vendor-pymupdf.py --dest debian/dangerzone/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/dangerzone/vendor/
 	dh_builddeb $@
--- a/dev_scripts/registry.py
+++ b/dev_scripts/registry.py
@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import platform
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+from base64 import b64decode
+from pathlib import Path
+from tempfile import NamedTemporaryFile
+
+import click
+import requests
+
+try:
+    import platformdirs
+except ImportError:
+    import appdirs as platformdirs
+
+
+def get_config_dir() -> str:
+    return Path(platformdirs.user_config_dir("dangerzone"))
+
+
+SIGNATURES_PATH = get_config_dir() / "signatures"
+
+DEFAULT_REPO = "freedomofpress/dangerzone"
+SIGSTORE_BUNDLE = "application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle.v0.3+json"
+DOCKER_MANIFEST_DISTRIBUTION = "application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json"
+DOCKER_MANIFEST_INDEX = "application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json"
+OCI_IMAGE_MANIFEST = "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
+
+
+class RegistryClient:
+    def __init__(self, registry, org, image):
+        self._registry = registry
+        self._org = org
+        self._image = image
+        self._auth_token = None
+        self._base_url = f"https://{registry}"
+        self._image_url = f"{self._base_url}/v2/{self._org}/{self._image}"
+
+    @property
+    def image(self):
+        return f"{self._registry}/{self._org}/{self._image}"
+
+    def get_auth_token(self):
+        if not self._auth_token:
+            auth_url = f"{self._base_url}/token"
+            response = requests.get(
+                auth_url,
+                params={
+                    "service": f"{self._registry}",
+                    "scope": f"repository:{self._org}/{self._image}:pull",
+                },
+            )
+            response.raise_for_status()
+            self._auth_token = response.json()["token"]
+        return self._auth_token
+
+    def get_auth_header(self):
+        return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.get_auth_token()}"}
+
+    def list_tags(self):
+        url = f"{self._image_url}/tags/list"
+        response = requests.get(url, headers=self.get_auth_header())
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        tags = response.json().get("tags", [])
+        return tags
+
+    def get_manifest(self, tag, extra_headers=None):
+        """Get manifest information for a specific tag"""
+        manifest_url = f"{self._image_url}/manifests/{tag}"
+        headers = {
+            "Accept": DOCKER_MANIFEST_DISTRIBUTION,
+            "Authorization": f"Bearer {self.get_auth_token()}",
+        }
+        if extra_headers:
+            headers.update(extra_headers)
+
+        response = requests.get(manifest_url, headers=headers)
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        return response
+
+    def list_manifests(self, tag):
+        return (
+            self.get_manifest(
+                tag,
+                {
+                    "Accept": DOCKER_MANIFEST_INDEX,
+                },
+            )
+            .json()
+            .get("manifests")
+        )
+
+    def get_blob(self, hash):
+        url = f"{self._image_url}/blobs/{hash}"
+        response = requests.get(
+            url,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": f"Bearer {self.get_auth_token()}",
+            },
+        )
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        return response
+
+    def get_manifest_hash(self, tag, tag_manifest_content=None):
+        if not tag_manifest_content:
+            tag_manifest_content = self.get_manifest(tag).content
+
+        return hashlib.sha256(tag_manifest_content).hexdigest()
+
+    def get_attestation(self, tag):
+        """
+        Retrieve an attestation from a given tag.
+
+        The attestation needs to be attached using the Cosign Bundle
+        Specification defined at:
+
+        https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/main/specs/BUNDLE_SPEC.md
+        """
+
+        def _find_sigstore_bundle_manifest(manifests):
+            for manifest in manifests:
+                if manifest["artifactType"] == SIGSTORE_BUNDLE:
+                    return manifest["mediaType"], manifest["digest"]
+
+        def _get_bundle_blob_digest(layers):
+            for layer in layers:
+                if layer.get("mediaType") == SIGSTORE_BUNDLE:
+                    return layer["digest"]
+
+        tag_manifest_content = self.get_manifest(tag).content
+
+        # The attestation is available on the same container registry, with a
+        # specific tag named "sha256-{sha256(manifest)}"
+        tag_manifest_hash = self.get_manifest_hash(tag, tag_manifest_content)
+
+        # This will get us a "list" of manifests...
+        manifests = self.list_manifests(f"sha256-{tag_manifest_hash}")
+
+        # ... from which we want the sigstore bundle
+        bundle_manifest_mediatype, bundle_manifest_digest = (
+            _find_sigstore_bundle_manifest(manifests)
+        )
+        if not bundle_manifest_digest:
+            raise Error("Not able to find sigstore bundle manifest info")
+
+        bundle_manifest = self.get_manifest(
+            bundle_manifest_digest, extra_headers={"Accept": bundle_manifest_mediatype}
+        ).json()
+
+        # From there, we will get the attestation in a blob.
+        # It will be the first layer listed at this manifest hash location
+        layers = bundle_manifest.get("layers", [])
+
+        blob_digest = _get_bundle_blob_digest(layers)
+        bundle = self.get_blob(blob_digest)
+        return tag_manifest_content, bundle.content
+
+
+def _write(file, content):
+    file.write(content)
+    file.flush()
+
+
+def verify_attestation(
+    registry_client: RegistryClient, image_tag: str, expected_repo: str
+):
+    """
+    Look up the image attestation to see if the image has been built
+    on Github runners, and from a given repository.
+    """
+    manifest, bundle = registry_client.get_attestation(image_tag)
+
+    # Put the value in files and verify with cosign
+    with (
+        NamedTemporaryFile(mode="wb") as manifest_json,
+        NamedTemporaryFile(mode="wb") as bundle_json,
+    ):
+        _write(manifest_json, manifest)
+        _write(bundle_json, bundle)
+
+        # Call cosign with the temporary file paths
+        cmd = [
+            "cosign",
+            "verify-blob-attestation",
+            "--bundle",
+            bundle_json.name,
+            "--new-bundle-format",
+            "--certificate-oidc-issuer",
+            "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
+            "--certificate-identity-regexp",
+            f"^https://github.com/{expected_repo}/.github/workflows/release-container-image.yml@refs/heads/test/image-publication-cosign",
+            manifest_json.name,
+        ]
+
+        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise Exception(f"Attestation cannot be verified. {result.stderr}")
+        return True
+
+
+def new_image_release():
+    # XXX - Implement
+    return True
+
+
+def signature_to_bundle(sig):
+    # Convert cosign-download signatures to the format expected by cosign bundle.
+    bundle = sig["Bundle"]
+    payload = bundle["Payload"]
+    return {
+        "base64Signature": sig["Base64Signature"],
+        "Payload": sig["Payload"],
+        "cert": sig["Cert"],
+        "chain": sig["Chain"],
+        "rekorBundle": {
+            "SignedEntryTimestamp": bundle["SignedEntryTimestamp"],
+            "Payload": {
+                "body": payload["body"],
+                "integratedTime": payload["integratedTime"],
+                "logIndex": payload["logIndex"],
+                "logID": payload["logID"],
+            },
+        },
+        "RFC3161Timestamp": sig["RFC3161Timestamp"],
+    }
+
+
+def verify_signature(signature, pubkey):
+    """Verify a signature against a given public key"""
+
+    signature_bundle = signature_to_bundle(signature)
+
+    # Put the value in files and verify with cosign
+    with (
+        NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w") as signature_file,
+        NamedTemporaryFile(mode="bw") as payload_file,
+    ):
+        json.dump(signature_bundle, signature_file)
+        signature_file.flush()
+
+        payload_bytes = b64decode(signature_bundle["Payload"])
+        _write(payload_file, payload_bytes)
+
+        cmd = [
+            "cosign",
+            "verify-blob",
+            "--key",
+            pubkey,
+            "--bundle",
+            signature_file.name,
+            payload_file.name,
+        ]
+        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            # XXX Raise instead?
+            return False
+        return result.stderr == b"Verified OK\n"
+
+
+def get_runtime_name() -> str:
+    if platform.system() == "Linux":
+        return "podman"
+    return "docker"
+
+
+def container_pull(image):
+    cmd = [get_runtime_name(), "pull", f"{image}"]
+    process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
+    process.communicate()
+
+
+def upgrade_container_image(image, tag, pubkey, registry: RegistryClient):
+    if not new_image_release():
+        return
+
+    hash = registry.get_manifest_hash(tag)
+    signatures = get_signatures(image, hash)
+
+    if len(signatures) < 1:
+        raise Exception("Unable to retrieve signatures")
+
+    print(f"Found {len(signatures)} signature(s) for {image}")
+    for signature in signatures:
+        signature_is_valid = verify_signature(signature, pubkey)
+        if not signature_is_valid:
+            raise Exception("Unable to verify signature")
+        print("✅ Signature is valid")
+
+    # At this point, the signatures are verified
+    # We store the signatures just now to avoid storing unverified signatures
+    store_signatures(signatures, hash, pubkey)
+
+    # let's upgrade the image
+    # XXX Use the hash here to avoid race conditions
+    container_pull(image)
+
+
+def get_file_hash(file):
+    with open(file, "rb") as f:
+        content = f.read()
+        return hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
+
+
+def load_signatures(image_hash, pubkey):
+    pubkey_signatures = SIGNATURES_PATH / get_file_hash(pubkey)
+    if not pubkey_signatures.exists():
+        msg = (
+            f"Cannot find a '{pubkey_signatures}' folder."
+            "You might need to download the image signatures first."
+        )
+        raise Exception(msg)
+
+    with open(pubkey_signatures / f"{image_hash}.json") as f:
+        return json.load(f)
+
+
+def store_signatures(signatures, image_hash, pubkey):
+    """
+    Store signatures locally in the SIGNATURE_PATH folder, like this:
+
+    ~/.config/dangerzone/signatures/
+    └── <pubkey-hash>
+        └── <image-hash>.json
+        └── <image-hash>.json
+
+    The format used in the `.json` file is the one of `cosign download
+    signature`, which differs from the "bundle" one used afterwards.
+
+    It can be converted to the one expected by cosign verify --bundle with
+    the `signature_to_bundle()` function.
+    """
+
+    def _get_digest(sig):
+        payload = json.loads(b64decode(sig["Payload"]))
+        return payload["critical"]["image"]["docker-manifest-digest"]
+
+    # All the signatures should share the same hash.
+    hashes = list(map(_get_digest, signatures))
+    if len(set(hashes)) != 1:
+        raise Exception("Signatures do not share the same image hash")
+
+    if f"sha256:{image_hash}" != hashes[0]:
+        raise Exception("Signatures do not match the given image hash")
+
+    pubkey_signatures = SIGNATURES_PATH / get_file_hash(pubkey)
+    pubkey_signatures.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+
+    with open(pubkey_signatures / f"{image_hash}.json", "w") as f:
+        json.dump(signatures, f)
+
+
+def verify_local_image_signature(image, pubkey):
+    """
+    Verifies that a local image has a valid signature
+    """
+    image_hash = get_image_hash(image)
+    signatures = load_signatures(image_hash, pubkey)
+    if len(signatures) < 1:
+        raise Exception("No signatures found")
+
+    for signature in signatures:
+        if not verify_signature(signature, pubkey):
+            msg = f"Unable to verify signature for {image} with pubkey {pubkey}"
+            raise Exception(msg)
+    return True
+
+
+def get_image_hash(image):
+    """
+    Returns a image hash from a local image name
+    """
+    cmd = [get_runtime_name(), "image", "inspect", image, "-f", "{{.Digest}}"]
+    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)
+    return result.stdout.strip().decode().strip("sha256:")
+
+
+def get_signatures(image, hash):
+    """
+    Retrieve the signatures from cosign download signature and convert each one to the "cosign bundle" format.
+    """
+
+    process = subprocess.run(
+        ["cosign", "download", "signature", f"{image}@sha256:{hash}"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=True,
+    )
+
+    # XXX: Check the output first.
+    # Remove the last return, split on newlines, convert from JSON
+    signatures_raw = process.stdout.decode("utf-8").strip().split("\n")
+    return list(map(json.loads, signatures_raw))
+
+
+class Image:
+    def __init__(self, registry, namespace, repository, tag="latest"):
+        self.registry = registry
+        self.namespace = namespace
+        self.repository = repository
+        self.tag = tag
+
+    def properties(self):
+        return (self.registry, self.namespace, self.repository, self.tag)
+
+    @property
+    def name_without_tag(self):
+        return f"{self.registry}/{self.namespace}/{self.repository}"
+
+    @property
+    def name_with_tag(self):
+        return f"{self.name_without_tag}:{self.tag}"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_string(cls, input_string):
+        """Parses container image location into (registry, namespace, repository, tag)"""
+        pattern = (
+            r"^"
+            r"(?P<registry>[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)/"
+            r"(?P<namespace>[a-zA-Z0-9-]+)/"
+            r"(?P<repository>[^:]+)"
+            r"(?::(?P<tag>[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+))?"
+            r"$"
+        )
+        match = re.match(pattern, input_string)
+        if not match:
+            raise ValueError("Malformed image location")
+
+        return cls(
+            match.group("registry"),
+            match.group("namespace"),
+            match.group("repository"),
+            match.group("tag") or "latest",
+        )
+
+
+def parse_image_location(string):
+    return Image.from_string(string).properties
+
+
+@click.group()
+def main():
+    pass
+
+
+@main.command()
+@click.argument("image")
+@click.option("--pubkey", default="pub.key")
+def upgrade_image(image, pubkey):
+    registry, namespace, repository, tag = parse_image_location(image)
+    registry_client = RegistryClient(registry, namespace, repository)
+
+    upgrade_container_image(image, tag, pubkey, registry_client)
+
+
+@main.command()
+@click.argument("image")
+@click.option("--pubkey", default="pub.key")
+def verify_local_image(image, pubkey):
+    # XXX remove a potentiel :tag
+    if verify_local_image_signature(image, pubkey):
+        click.echo(f"✅ The local image {image} has been signed with {pubkey}")
+
+
+@main.command()
+@click.argument("image")
+def list_tags(image):
+    registry, org, package, _ = parse_image_location(image)
+    client = RegistryClient(registry, org, package)
+    tags = client.list_tags()
+    click.echo(f"Existing tags for {client.image}")
+    for tag in tags:
+        click.echo(tag)
+
+
+@main.command()
+@click.argument("image")
+@click.argument("tag")
+def get_manifest(image, tag):
+    registry, org, package, _ = parse_image_location(image)
+    client = RegistryClient(registry, org, package)
+    resp = client.get_manifest(tag, extra_headers={"Accept": OCI_IMAGE_MANIFEST})
+    click.echo(resp.content)
+
+
+@main.command()
+@click.argument("image")
+@click.option(
+    "--repo",
+    default=DEFAULT_REPO,
+    help="The github repository to check the attestation for",
+)
+def attest(image: str, repo: str):
+    """
+    Look up the image attestation to see if the image has been built
+    on Github runners, and from a given repository.
+    """
+    if shutil.which("cosign") is None:
+        click.echo("The cosign binary is needed but not installed.")
+        raise click.Abort()
+
+    registry, org, package, tag = parse_image_location(image)
+    tag = tag or "latest"
+
+    client = RegistryClient(registry, org, package)
+    verified = verify_attestation(client, tag, repo)
+    if verified:
+        click.echo(
+            f"🎉 The image available at `{client.image}:{tag}` has been built by Github Runners from the `{repo}` repository"
+        )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
--- a/dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
+++ b/dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import logging
+import pathlib
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+DIFFOCI_URL = "https://github.com/reproducible-containers/diffoci/releases/download/v0.1.5/diffoci-v0.1.5.linux-amd64"
+DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM = "01d25fe690196945a6bd510d30559338aa489c034d3a1b895a0d82a4b860698f"
+DIFFOCI_PATH = (
+    pathlib.Path.home() / ".local" / "share" / "dangerzone-dev" / "helpers" / "diffoci"
+)
+IMAGE_NAME = "dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone"
+
+
+def run(*args):
+    """Simple function that runs a command, validates it, and returns the output"""
+    logger.debug(f"Running command: {' '.join(args)}")
+    return subprocess.run(
+        args,
+        check=True,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+    ).stdout
+
+
+def git_commit_get():
+    return run("git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD").decode().strip()
+
+
+def git_determine_tag():
+    return run("git", "describe", "--long", "--first-parent").decode().strip()[1:]
+
+
+def git_verify(commit, source):
+    if not commit in source:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Image '{source}' does not seem to be built from commit '{commit}'"
+        )
+
+
+def diffoci_hash_matches(diffoci):
+    """Check if the hash of the downloaded diffoci bin matches the expected one."""
+    m = hashlib.sha256()
+    m.update(diffoci)
+    diffoci_checksum = m.hexdigest()
+    return diffoci_checksum == DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM
+
+
+def diffoci_is_installed():
+    """Determine if diffoci has been installed.
+
+    Determine if diffoci has been installed, by checking if the binary exists, and if
+    its hash is the expected one. If the binary exists but the hash is different, then
+    this is a sign that we need to update the local diffoci binary.
+    """
+    if not DIFFOCI_PATH.exists():
+        return False
+    return diffoci_hash_matches(DIFFOCI_PATH.open("rb").read())
+
+
+def diffoci_download():
+    """Download the diffoci tool, based on a URL and its checksum."""
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(DIFFOCI_URL) as f:
+        diffoci_bin = f.read()
+
+    if not diffoci_hash_matches(diffoci_bin):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Unexpected checksum for downloaded diffoci binary:"
+            f" {diffoci_checksum} !={DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM}"
+        )
+
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.open("wb+").write(diffoci_bin)
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.chmod(DIFFOCI_PATH.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)
+
+
+def diffoci_diff(source, local_target):
+    """Diff the source image against the recently built target image using diffoci."""
+    target = f"podman://{local_target}"
+    try:
+        return run(
+            str(DIFFOCI_PATH),
+            "diff",
+            source,
+            target,
+            "--semantic",
+            "--verbose",
+        )
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        error = e.stdout.decode()
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not rebuild an identical image to {source}. Diffoci report:\n{error}"
+        )
+
+
+def build_image(tag, use_cache=False):
+    """Build the Dangerzone container image with a special tag."""
+    run(
+        "python3",
+        "./install/common/build-image.py",
+        "--no-save",
+        "--use-cache",
+        str(use_cache),
+        "--tag",
+        tag,
+    )
+
+
+def parse_args():
+    image_tag = git_determine_tag()
+    # TODO: Remove the local "podman://" prefix once we have started pushing images to a
+    # remote.
+    default_image_name = f"podman://{IMAGE_NAME}:{image_tag}"
+
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog=sys.argv[0],
+        description="Dev script for verifying container image reproducibility",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--source",
+        default=default_image_name,
+        help=(
+            "The name of the image that you want to reproduce. If the image resides in"
+            " the local Docker / Podman engine, you can prefix it with podman:// or"
+            f" docker:// accordingly (default: {default_image_name})"
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--use-cache",
+        default=False,
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Whether to reuse the build cache (off by default for better reproducibility)",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main():
+    logging.basicConfig(
+        level=logging.DEBUG,
+        format="%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s",
+        datefmt="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
+    )
+    args = parse_args()
+
+    logger.info(f"Ensuring that current Git commit matches image '{args.source}'")
+    commit = git_commit_get()
+    git_verify(commit, args.source)
+
+    if not diffoci_is_installed():
+        logger.info(f"Downloading diffoci helper from {DIFFOCI_URL}")
+        diffoci_download()
+
+    tag = f"reproduce-{commit}"
+    target = f"{IMAGE_NAME}:{tag}"
+    logger.info(f"Building container image and tagging it as '{target}'")
+    build_image(tag, args.use_cache)
+
+    logger.info(
+        f"Ensuring that source image '{args.source}' is semantically identical with"
+        f" built image '{target}'"
+    )
+    try:
+        diffoci_diff(args.source, target)
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not reproduce image {args.source} for commit {commit}"
+        )
+        breakpoint()
+
+    logger.info(f"Successfully reproduced image '{args.source}' from commit '{commit}'")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
--- a/docs/developer/doit.md
+++ b/docs/developer/doit.md
@ -44,20 +44,6 @@ doit <task>
 * You can run `doit list --all -s` to see the full list of tasks, their
  dependencies, and whether they are up to date.
 * You can run `doit info <task>` to see which dependencies are missing.
-* You can change this line in `pyproject.toml` to `true`, to allow using the
-  Docker/Podman build cache:
-
-  ```
-  use_cache = true
-  ```
-
-  > [!WARNING]
-  > Using caching may speed up image builds, but is not suitable for release
-  > artifacts. The ID of our base container image (Alpine Linux) does not change
-  > that often, but its APK package index does. So, if we use caching, we risk
-  > skipping the `apk upgrade` layer and end up with packages that are days
-  > behind.
-
 * You can pass the following environment variables to the script, in order to
  affect some global parameters:
  - `CONTAINER_RUNTIME`: The container runtime to use. Either `podman` (default)
--- a/docs/developer/gvisor.md
+++ b/docs/developer/gvisor.md
@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # gVisor integration

+> [!NOTE]
+> **Update on 2025-01-13:** There is no longer a copied container image under
+> `/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs`. We now reuse the same container
+> image both for the inner and outer container. See
+> [#1048](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/issues/1048).
+
 Dangerzone has relied on the container runtime available in each supported
 operating system (Docker Desktop on Windows / macOS, Podman on Linux) to isolate
 the host from the sanitization process. The problem with this type of isolation
--- a/docs/developer/independent-container-updates.md
+++ b/docs/developer/independent-container-updates.md
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Independent Container Updates
+
+Since version 0.9.0, Dangerzone is able to ship container images independently
+from issuing a new release of the software.
+
+This is useful as images need to be kept updated with the latest security fixes.
+
+## Nightly images and attestations
+
+Each night, new images are built and pushed to our container registry, alongside
+with a provenance attestation, enabling anybody to ensure that the image has
+been originally built by Github CI runners, from a defined source repository (in our case `freedomofpress/dangerzone`).
+
+To verify the attestations against our expectations, use the following command:
+```bash
+poetry run ./dev_scripts/registry.py attest ghcr.io/freedomofpress/dangerzone/dangerzone:latest --repo freedomofpress/dangerzone
+```
+
+In case of sucess, it will report back:
+
+```
+🎉 The image available at `ghcr.io/freedomofpress/dangerzone/dangerzone:latest` has been built by Github runners from the `freedomofpress/dangerzone` repository.
+```
--- a/docs/developer/reproducibility.md
+++ b/docs/developer/reproducibility.md
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Reproducible builds
+
+We want to improve the transparency and auditability of our build artifacts, and
+a way to achieve this is via reproducible builds. For a broader understanding of
+what reproducible builds entail, check out https://reproducible-builds.org/.
+
+Our build artifacts consist of:
+* Container images (`amd64` and `arm64` architectures)
+* macOS installers (for Intel and Apple Silicon CPUs)
+* Windows installer
+* Fedora packages (for regular Fedora distros and Qubes)
+* Debian packages (for Debian and Ubuntu)
+
+As of writing this, only the following artifacts are reproducible:
+* Container images (see [#1047](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/issues/1047))
+
+In the following sections, we'll mention some specifics about enforcing
+reproducibility for each artifact type.
+
+## Container image
+
+### Updating the image
+
+The fact that our image is reproducible also means that it's frozen in time.
+This means that rebuilding the image without updating our Dockerfile will
+**not** receive security updates.
+
+Here are the necessary variables that make up our image in the `Dockerfile.env`
+file:
+* `DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE`: The date that the Debian container image was released
+* `DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE`: The Debian snapshot repo that we want to use
+* `GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE`: The gVisor APT repo that we want to use
+* `H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM`: The SHA-256 checksum of the H2ORestart plugin
+* `H2ORESTART_VERSION`: The version of the H2ORestart plugin
+
+If you update these values in `Dockerfile.env`, you must also create a new
+Dockerfile with:
+
+```
+make Dockerfile
+```
+
+Updating `Dockerfile` without bumping `Dockerfile.in` is detected and should
+trigger a CI error.
+
+### Reproducing the image
+
+For a simple way to reproduce a Dangerzone container image, you can checkout the
+commit this image was built from (you can find it from the image tag in its
+`g<commit>` portion), and run the following command in a Linux environment:
+
+```
+./dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py --source <image>
+```
+
+This command will download the `diffoci` helper, build a container image from
+the current Git commit, and ensure that the built image matches the source one,
+with the exception of image names and file timestamps.
+
+> [!TIP]
+> If the source image is not pushed to a registry, and is local instead, you
+> can prefix it with `docker://` or `podman://` accordingly, so that `diffoci`
+> can load it from the local Docker / Podman container engine. For example:
+>
+> ```
+> ./dev_scripts/reproduce.py --source podman://dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone:0.8.0-125-g725ce3b
+> ```
--- a/dodo.py
+++ b/dodo.py
@ -27,16 +27,6 @@ PARAM_APPLE_ID = {
    "help": "The Apple developer ID that will be used to sign the .dmg",
 }

-PARAM_USE_CACHE = {
-    "name": "use_cache",
-    "long": "use-cache",
-    "help": (
-        "Whether to use cached results or not. For reproducibility reasons,"
-        " it's best to leave it to false"
-    ),
-    "default": False,
-}
-
 ### File dependencies
 #
 # Define all the file dependencies for our tasks in a single place, since some file
@ -63,9 +53,8 @@ TESSDATA_TARGETS = list_language_data()

 IMAGE_DEPS = [
    "Dockerfile",
-    "poetry.lock",
    *list_files("dangerzone/conversion"),
-    "dangerzone/gvisor_wrapper/entrypoint.py",
+    *list_files("dangerzone/container_helpers"),
    "install/common/build-image.py",
 ]
 IMAGE_TARGETS = ["share/container.tar.gz", "share/image-id.txt"]
@ -206,11 +195,10 @@ def task_build_image():

    return {
        "actions": [
-            f"python install/common/build-image.py --use-cache=%(use_cache)s --runtime={CONTAINER_RUNTIME}",
+            f"python install/common/build-image.py --runtime={CONTAINER_RUNTIME}",
            ["cp", img_src, img_dst],
            ["cp", img_id_src, img_id_dst],
        ],
-        "params": [PARAM_USE_CACHE],
        "file_dep": IMAGE_DEPS,
        "targets": [img_src, img_dst, img_id_src, img_id_dst],
        "task_dep": ["init_release_dir", "check_container_runtime"],
--- a/install/common/build-image.py
+++ b/install/common/build-image.py
@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 import argparse
 import gzip
-import os
 import platform
 import secrets
 import subprocess
@ -9,7 +8,6 @@ from pathlib import Path

 BUILD_CONTEXT = "dangerzone/"
 IMAGE_NAME = "dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone"
-REQUIREMENTS_TXT = "container-pip-requirements.txt"
 if platform.system() in ["Darwin", "Windows"]:
    CONTAINER_RUNTIME = "docker"
 elif platform.system() == "Linux":
@ -29,6 +27,29 @@ def str2bool(v):
        raise argparse.ArgumentTypeError("Boolean value expected.")


+def determine_git_tag():
+    # Designate a unique tag for this image, depending on the Git commit it was created
+    # from:
+    # 1. If created from a Git tag (e.g., 0.8.0), the image tag will be `0.8.0`.
+    # 2. If created from a commit, it will be something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a`.
+    # 3. If the contents of the Git repo are dirty, we will append a unique identifier
+    #    for this run, something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a-fdcb` or `0.8.0-fdcb`.
+    dirty_ident = secrets.token_hex(2)
+    return (
+        subprocess.check_output(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "describe",
+                "--long",
+                "--first-parent",
+                f"--dirty=-{dirty_ident}",
+            ],
+        )
+        .decode()
+        .strip()[1:]  # remove the "v" prefix of the tag.
+    )
+
+
 def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument(
@ -53,9 +74,14 @@ def main():
        "--use-cache",
        type=str2bool,
        nargs="?",
-        default=False,
+        default=True,
        const=True,
-        help="Use the builder's cache to speed up the builds (not suitable for release builds)",
+        help="Use the builder's cache to speed up the builds",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--tag",
+        default=None,
+        help="Provide a custom tag for the image (for development only)",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

@ -64,39 +90,13 @@ def main():

    print(f"Building for architecture '{ARCH}'")

-    # Designate a unique tag for this image, depending on the Git commit it was created
-    # from:
-    # 1. If created from a Git tag (e.g., 0.8.0), the image tag will be `0.8.0`.
-    # 2. If created from a commit, it will be something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a`.
-    # 3. If the contents of the Git repo are dirty, we will append a unique identifier
-    #    for this run, something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a-fdcb` or `0.8.0-fdcb`.
-    dirty_ident = secrets.token_hex(2)
-    tag = (
-        subprocess.check_output(
-            ["git", "describe", "--long", "--first-parent", f"--dirty=-{dirty_ident}"],
-        )
-        .decode()
-        .strip()[1:]  # remove the "v" prefix of the tag.
-    )
+    tag = args.tag or determine_git_tag()
    image_name_tagged = IMAGE_NAME + ":" + tag

    print(f"Will tag the container image as '{image_name_tagged}'")
    with open(image_id_path, "w") as f:
        f.write(tag)

-    print("Exporting container pip dependencies")
-    with ContainerPipDependencies():
-        if not args.use_cache:
-            print("Pulling base image")
-            subprocess.run(
-                [
-                    args.runtime,
-                    "pull",
-                    "alpine:latest",
-                ],
-                check=True,
-            )
-
    # Build the container image, and tag it with the calculated tag
    print("Building container image")
    cache_args = [] if args.use_cache else ["--no-cache"]
@ -106,10 +106,6 @@ def main():
            "build",
            BUILD_CONTEXT,
            *cache_args,
-                "--build-arg",
-                f"REQUIREMENTS_TXT={REQUIREMENTS_TXT}",
-                "--build-arg",
-                f"ARCH={ARCH}",
            "-f",
            "Dockerfile",
            "--tag",
@ -145,31 +141,5 @@ def main():
        cmd.wait(5)


-class ContainerPipDependencies:
-    """Generates PIP dependencies within container"""
-
-    def __enter__(self):
-        try:
-            container_requirements_txt = subprocess.check_output(
-                ["poetry", "export", "--only", "container"], universal_newlines=True
-            )
-        except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
-            print("FAILURE", e.returncode, e.output)
-        print(f"REQUIREMENTS: {container_requirements_txt}")
-        # XXX Export container dependencies and exclude pymupdfb since it is not needed in container
-        req_txt_pymupdfb_stripped = container_requirements_txt.split("pymupdfb")[0]
-        with open(Path(BUILD_CONTEXT) / REQUIREMENTS_TXT, "w") as f:
-            if ARCH == "arm64":
-                # PyMuPDF needs to be built on ARM64 machines
-                # But is already provided as a prebuilt-wheel on other architectures
-                f.write(req_txt_pymupdfb_stripped)
-            else:
-                f.write(container_requirements_txt)
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, exc_tb):
-        print("Leaving the context...")
-        os.remove(Path(BUILD_CONTEXT) / REQUIREMENTS_TXT)
-
-
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())
--- a/install/linux/dangerzone.spec
+++ b/install/linux/dangerzone.spec
@ -216,16 +216,11 @@ convert the documents within a secure sandbox.
 %prep
 %autosetup -p1 -n dangerzone-%{version}

-# XXX: Bump the Python requirement in pyproject.toml from <3.13 to <3.14. Fedora
-# 41 comes with Python 3.13 installed, but our pyproject.toml does not support
-# it because PySide6 in PyPI works with Python 3.12 or earlier.
-#
-# This hack sidesteps this issue, and we haven't noticed any paticular problem
-# with the package that is built from that.
-%if 0%{?fedora} == 41
-sed -i 's/<3.13/<3.14/' pyproject.toml
-%endif
-
+# Bypass the version pin for Fedora as the 6.8.1.1 package is causing trouble
+# A 6.8.1.1 package was only released with a wheel for macOS, but was picked by
+# Fedora packagers. We cannot use "*" when PyPI is involved as it will fail to download the latest version.
+# For Fedora, we can pick any of the released versions.
+ sed -i '/shiboken6 = \[/,/\]/c\shiboken6 = "*"' pyproject.toml

 %generate_buildrequires
 %pyproject_buildrequires -R
--- a/install/linux/debian-vendor-pymupdf.py
+++ b/install/linux/debian-vendor-pymupdf.py
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ def main():
    )

    logger.info("Getting PyMuPDF deps as requirements.txt")
-    cmd = ["poetry", "export", "--only", "container"]
+    cmd = ["poetry", "export", "--only", "debian"]
    container_requirements_txt = subprocess.check_output(cmd)

    # XXX: Hack for Ubuntu Focal.
--- a/poetry.lock
+++ b/poetry.lock
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-    [tool.poetry]
+[tool.poetry]
 name = "dangerzone"
 version = "0.8.1"
 description = "Take potentially dangerous PDFs, office documents, or images and convert them to safe PDFs"
@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ include = [
 ]

 [tool.poetry.dependencies]
-python = ">=3.9,<3.13"
+python = ">=3.9,<3.14"
 click = "*"
-appdirs = "*"
+platformdirs = "*"
 PySide6 = "^6.7.1"
 PyMuPDF = "^1.23.3"  # The version in Fedora 39
 colorama = "*"
@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ pyxdg = {version = "*", platform = "linux"}
 requests = "*"
 markdown = "*"
 packaging = "*"
+# shiboken6 released a 6.8.1.1 version only for macOS
+# and it's getting picked by poetry, so pin it instead.
+shiboken6 = [
+    {version = "*", platform = "darwin"},
+    {version = "<6.8.1.1", platform = "linux"},
+    {version = "<6.8.1.1", platform = "win32"},
+]

 [tool.poetry.scripts]
 dangerzone = 'dangerzone:main'
@ -35,6 +42,7 @@ cx_freeze = {version = "^7.2.5", platform = "win32"}
 pywin32 = {version = "*", platform = "win32"}
 pyinstaller = {version = "*", platform = "darwin"}
 doit = "^0.36.0"
+jinja2-cli = "^0.8.2"

 # Dependencies required for linting the code.
 [tool.poetry.group.lint.dependencies]
@ -57,7 +65,7 @@ strip-ansi = "*"
 pytest-subprocess = "^1.5.2"
 pytest-rerunfailures = "^14.0"

-[tool.poetry.group.container.dependencies]
+[tool.poetry.group.debian.dependencies]
 pymupdf = "1.24.11" # Last version to support python 3.8 (needed for Ubuntu Focal support)

 [tool.poetry.group.dev.dependencies]
@ -66,11 +74,6 @@ httpx = "^0.27.2"
 [tool.doit]
 verbosity = 3

-[tool.doit.tasks.build_image]
-# DO NOT change this to 'true' for release artifacts, else we risk building
-# images that are a few days behind. See also: docs/developer/doit.md
-use_cache = false
-
 [tool.ruff.lint]
 select = [
    # isort
--- a/tests/gui/test_main_window.py
+++ b/tests/gui/test_main_window.py
@ -587,3 +587,57 @@ def test_installation_failure_return_false(qtbot: QtBot, mocker: MockerFixture)

    assert "the following error occured" in widget.label.text()
    assert "The image cannot be found" in widget.traceback.toPlainText()
+
+
+def test_up_to_date_docker_desktop_does_nothing(
+    qtbot: QtBot, mocker: MockerFixture
+) -> None:
+    # Setup install to return False
+    mock_app = mocker.MagicMock()
+    dummy = mocker.MagicMock(spec=Container)
+    dummy.check_docker_desktop_version.return_value = (True, "1.0.0")
+    dz = DangerzoneGui(mock_app, dummy)
+
+    window = MainWindow(dz)
+    qtbot.addWidget(window)
+
+    menu_actions = window.hamburger_button.menu().actions()
+    assert "Docker Desktop should be upgraded" not in [
+        a.toolTip() for a in menu_actions
+    ]
+
+
+def test_outdated_docker_desktop_displays_warning(
+    qtbot: QtBot, mocker: MockerFixture
+) -> None:
+    # Setup install to return False
+    mock_app = mocker.MagicMock()
+    dummy = mocker.MagicMock(spec=Container)
+    dummy.check_docker_desktop_version.return_value = (False, "1.0.0")
+
+    dz = DangerzoneGui(mock_app, dummy)
+
+    load_svg_spy = mocker.spy(main_window_module, "load_svg_image")
+
+    window = MainWindow(dz)
+    qtbot.addWidget(window)
+
+    menu_actions = window.hamburger_button.menu().actions()
+    assert menu_actions[0].toolTip() == "Docker Desktop should be upgraded"
+
+    # Check that the hamburger icon has changed with the expected SVG image.
+    assert load_svg_spy.call_count == 4
+    assert (
+        load_svg_spy.call_args_list[2].args[0] == "hamburger_menu_update_dot_error.svg"
+    )
+
+    alert_spy = mocker.spy(window.alert, "launch")
+
+    # Clicking the menu item should open a warning message
+    def _check_alert_displayed() -> None:
+        alert_spy.assert_any_call()
+        if window.alert:
+            window.alert.close()
+
+    QtCore.QTimer.singleShot(0, _check_alert_displayed)
+    menu_actions[0].trigger()
--- a/tests/isolation_provider/test_container.py
+++ b/tests/isolation_provider/test_container.py
@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import os
+import platform

 import pytest
 from pytest_mock import MockerFixture
@ -108,6 +109,92 @@ class TestContainer(IsolationProviderTest):
        with pytest.raises(errors.ImageNotPresentException):
            provider.install()

+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        platform.system() not in ("Windows", "Darwin"),
+        reason="macOS and Windows specific",
+    )
+    def test_old_docker_desktop_version_is_detected(
+        self, mocker: MockerFixture, provider: Container, fp: FakeProcess
+    ) -> None:
+        fp.register_subprocess(
+            [
+                "docker",
+                "version",
+                "--format",
+                "{{.Server.Platform.Name}}",
+            ],
+            stdout="Docker Desktop 1.0.0 (173100)",
+        )
+
+        mocker.patch(
+            "dangerzone.isolation_provider.container.MINIMUM_DOCKER_DESKTOP",
+            {"Darwin": "1.0.1", "Windows": "1.0.1"},
+        )
+        assert (False, "1.0.0") == provider.check_docker_desktop_version()
+
+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        platform.system() not in ("Windows", "Darwin"),
+        reason="macOS and Windows specific",
+    )
+    def test_up_to_date_docker_desktop_version_is_detected(
+        self, mocker: MockerFixture, provider: Container, fp: FakeProcess
+    ) -> None:
+        fp.register_subprocess(
+            [
+                "docker",
+                "version",
+                "--format",
+                "{{.Server.Platform.Name}}",
+            ],
+            stdout="Docker Desktop 1.0.1 (173100)",
+        )
+
+        # Require version 1.0.1
+        mocker.patch(
+            "dangerzone.isolation_provider.container.MINIMUM_DOCKER_DESKTOP",
+            {"Darwin": "1.0.1", "Windows": "1.0.1"},
+        )
+        assert (True, "1.0.1") == provider.check_docker_desktop_version()
+
+        fp.register_subprocess(
+            [
+                "docker",
+                "version",
+                "--format",
+                "{{.Server.Platform.Name}}",
+            ],
+            stdout="Docker Desktop 2.0.0 (173100)",
+        )
+        assert (True, "2.0.0") == provider.check_docker_desktop_version()
+
+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        platform.system() not in ("Windows", "Darwin"),
+        reason="macOS and Windows specific",
+    )
+    def test_docker_desktop_version_failure_returns_true(
+        self, mocker: MockerFixture, provider: Container, fp: FakeProcess
+    ) -> None:
+        fp.register_subprocess(
+            [
+                "docker",
+                "version",
+                "--format",
+                "{{.Server.Platform.Name}}",
+            ],
+            stderr="Oopsie",
+            returncode=1,
+        )
+        assert provider.check_docker_desktop_version() == (True, "")
+
+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        platform.system() != "Linux",
+        reason="Linux specific",
+    )
+    def test_linux_skips_desktop_version_check_returns_true(
+        self, mocker: MockerFixture, provider: Container
+    ) -> None:
+        assert (True, "") == provider.check_docker_desktop_version()
+

 class TestContainerTermination(IsolationProviderTermination):
    pass
--- a/tests/test_util.py
+++ b/tests/test_util.py
@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ VERSION_FILE_NAME = "version.txt"
 def test_get_resource_path() -> None:
    share_dir = Path("share").resolve()
    resource_path = Path(util.get_resource_path(VERSION_FILE_NAME)).parent
-    assert share_dir.samefile(
-        resource_path
-    ), f"{share_dir} is not the same file as {resource_path}"
+    assert share_dir.samefile(resource_path), (
+        f"{share_dir} is not the same file as {resource_path}"
+    )


@pytest.mark.skipif(platform.system() != "Windows", reason="Windows-specific")
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Alexis Métaireau	cbd4795bf6	Verify podman/docker images against locally stored signatures Some checks are pending Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run-lint (push) Waiting to run Details Tests / build-container-image (push) Waiting to run Details Tests / Download and cache Tesseract data (push) Waiting to run Details Tests / windows (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / check-reproducibility (push) Waiting to run Details Release container image / build-container-image (push) Waiting to run Details	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	47252cc31d	Automate the verification of image signatures	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	bcd1ec2173	Add an utility to retrieve manifest info	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	5817650633	Add a script to verify Github attestations	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	8f49cd99eb	FIXUP: test	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	f0ac1f885f	Add logs	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	554736cab3	Remove the tag from the attestation, what we attest is the hash, so no need for it	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	891ffe4fec	Add the tag to the subject	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	2a80bf0c26	Get the tag from git before retagging it	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	ac62a153dc	Checkout with depth:0 otherwise git commands aren't functional	2025-01-28 16:21:29 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	13449641ca	Build: Use Github runners to build and sign container images on new tags	2025-01-28 16:21:28 +01:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	88a6b37770	Add support for Python 3.13 Some checks failed Scan latest app and container / security-scan-container (push) Has been cancelled Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-app (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / windows (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Bump our max supported Python version to 3.13, now that PySide6 supports it. Fixes #992	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	fb90243668	Symlink /usr in Debian container image Update our Dockerfile and entrypoint script in order to reuse the /usr dir in the inner and outer container image. Refs #1048	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	9724a16d81	Mask some extra paths in gVisor's OCI config Mask some paths of the outer container in the OCI config of the inner container. This is done to avoid leaking any sensitive information from Podman / Docker / gVisor, since we reuse the same rootfs Refs #1048	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cf43a7a0c4	docs: Add design document for artifact reproducibility Refs #1047	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cae4187550	Update RELEASE.md Co-authored-by: Alexis Métaireau <alexis@freedom.press>	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cfa4478ace	ci: Add a CI job that enforces image reproducibility Add a CI job that uses the `reproduce.py` dev script to enforce image reproducibility, for every PR that we send to the repo. Fixes #1047	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	2557be9bc0	dev_scripts: Add script for enforcing image reproducibility Add a dev script for Linux platforms that verifies that a source image can be reproducibly built from the current Git commit. The reproducibility check is enforced by the `diffoci` tool, which is downloaded as part of running the script.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	235d71354a	Allow setting a tag for the container image Allow setting a tag for the container image, when building it with the `build-image.py` script. This should be used for development purposes only, since the proper image name should be dictated by the script.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	5d49f5abdb	ci: Scan the latest image for CVEs Update the Debian snapshot date to the current one, so that we always scan the latest image for CVEs. Refs #1057	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	0ce7773ca1	Render the Dockerfile from a template and some params Allow updating the Dockerfile from a template and some envs, so that it's easier to bump the dates in it.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	fa27f4b063	Add jinja2-cli package dependency Add jinja2-cli as a package dependency, since it will be used to create the Dockerfile from some user parameters and a template.	2025-01-23 23:26:56 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	8e8a515b64	Allow using the container engine cache when building our image Remove our suggestions for not using the container cache, which stemmed from the fact that our Dangerzone image was not reproducible. Now that we have switched to Debian Stable and the Dockerfile is all we need to reproducibly build the exact same container image, we can just use the cache to speed up builds.	2025-01-23 23:25:43 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	270cae1bc0	Rename vendor-pymupdf.py to debian-vendor-pymupdf.py Rename the `vendor-pymupdf.py` script to `debian-vendor-pymupdf.py`, since it's used only when building Debian packages.	2025-01-23 23:25:43 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	14bb6c0e39	Do not use poetry.lock when building the container image Remove all the scaffolding in our `build-image.py` script for using the `poetry.lock` file, now that we install PyMuPDF from the Debian repos.	2025-01-23 23:25:39 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	033ce0986d	Switch base image to Debian Stable Switch base image from Alpine Linux to Debian Stable, in order to reduce our image footprint, improve our security posture, and build our container image reproducibly. Fixes #1046 Refs #1047	2025-01-23 23:24:48 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	935396565c	Reuse the same rootfs for the inner and outer container Remove the need to copy the Dangerzone container image (used by the inner container) within a wrapper gVisor image (used by the outer container). Instead, use the root of the container filesystem for both containers. We can do this safely because we don't mount any secrets to the container, and because gVisor offers a read-only view of the underlying filesystem Fixes #1048	2025-01-23 23:24:48 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	e29837cb43	Copy gVisor public key and a helper script in container helpers Download and copy the following artifacts that will be used for building a Debian-based Dangerzone container image in the subsequent commits: * The APT key for the gVisor repo [1] * A helper script for building reproducible Debian images [2] [1] https://gvisor.dev/archive.key [2] `d15cf12b26/repro-sources-list.sh`	2025-01-23 23:24:48 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	8568b4bb9d	Move container-only build context to `dangerzone/container` Move container-only build context (currently just the entrypoint script) from `dangerzone/gvisor_wrapper` to `dangerzone/container_helpers`. Update the rest of the scripts to use this location as well.	2025-01-23 23:24:48 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	be1fa7a395	Whitespace fixes	2025-01-23 23:24:47 +02:00
Alexis Métaireau	b2f4e2d523	Bump poetry.lock Some checks are pending Tests / windows (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (fedora 40) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (fedora 41) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-container (push) Waiting to run Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-app (push) Waiting to run Details	2025-01-23 16:26:07 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	7409966253	Remove `${Python3:Depends}` as it's not used at the moment.	2025-01-23 16:26:06 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	40fb6579f6	Alternatives for debian/control	2025-01-23 16:26:06 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	6ae91b024e	Use `platformdirs` to find user configuration files The previous library we were using for this (`appdirs`) is dead upstream and not supported anymore in debian testing. Fixes #1058	2025-01-23 16:26:06 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	c2841dcc08	Run ruff format Some checks failed Tests / build-container-image (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / Download and cache Tesseract data (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / windows (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details	2025-01-23 14:48:33 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	df5ccb3f75	Fedora: bypass the shiboken specific version.	2025-01-23 14:39:50 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	9c6c2e1051	build: pin shiboken6 to specific versions	2025-01-23 12:52:48 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	23f3ad1f46	doc: bump the Docker Desktop version as part of the RELEASE procedure Some checks failed Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-container (push) Has been cancelled Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-app (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / windows (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details	2025-01-21 10:21:24 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	970a82f432	Bind `Alert` instances to the main window `alert` property	2025-01-21 10:21:24 +01:00
Alexis Métaireau	3d5cacfffb	Warn users if the minimum version of Docker Desktop is not met This only happens on Windows and macOS. Fixes #693	2025-01-21 10:21:24 +01:00