Add support for Python 3.13

Bump our max supported Python version to 3.13, now that PySide6 supports it. Fixes #992
Symlink /usr in Debian container image
2025-05-18 19:20:35 +02:00 · 2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00 · 2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00 · 2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00 · 2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00 · 2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
17 changed files with 796 additions and 66 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@ -471,3 +471,30 @@ jobs:
          #     file successfully.
          xvfb-run -s '-ac' ./dev_scripts/env.py --distro ${{ matrix.distro }} --version ${{ matrix.version }} run --dev \
              bash -c 'cd dangerzone; poetry run make test'
+
+  check-reproducibility:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Install dev. dependencies
+        run: |-
+          sudo apt-get update
+          sudo apt-get install -y git python3-poetry --no-install-recommends
+          poetry install --only package
+
+      - name: Verify that the Dockerfile matches the commited template and params
+        run: |-
+          cp Dockerfile Dockerfile.orig
+          make Dockerfile
+          diff Dockerfile.orig Dockerfile
+
+      - name: Build Dangerzone container image
+        run: |
+          python3 ./install/common/build-image.py --no-save
+
+      - name: Reproduce the same container image
+        run: |
+          ./dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
--- a/.github/workflows/scan.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/scan.yml
@ -21,13 +21,17 @@ jobs:
          sudo apt install pipx
          pipx install poetry
          pipx inject poetry poetry-plugin-export
+          poetry install --only package
+      - name: Bump date of Debian snapshot archive
+        run: |
+          date=$(date "+%Y%m%d")
+          sed -i "s/DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=[0-9]\+/DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=${date}/" Dockerfile.env
+          make Dockerfile
      - name: Build container image
        run: python3 ./install/common/build-image.py --runtime docker --no-save
      - name: Get image tag
        id: tag
-        run: |
-          tag=$(docker images dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone --format '{{ .Tag }}')
-          echo "tag=$tag" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+        run: echo "tag=$(cat share/image-id.txt)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
      # NOTE: Scan first without failing, else we won't be able to read the scan
      # report.
      - name: Scan container image (no fail)
--- a/.grype.yaml
+++ b/.grype.yaml
@ -2,10 +2,38 @@
 # latest release of Dangerzone, and offer our analysis.

 ignore:
-  # CVE-2024-11053
+  # CVE-2023-45853
  # ==============
  #
-  # NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11053
-  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because libcurl is an HTTP client, and
-  # the Dangerzone container does not make any network calls.
-  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-11053
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-45853
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because the zlib library in Debian is
+  # built in a way that is not vulnerable.
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2023-45853
+  # CVE-2024-38428
+  # ==============
+  #
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-38428
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected because it doesn't use wget in the
+  # container image (which also has no network connectivity).
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-38428
+  # CVE-2024-57823
+  # ==============
+  #
+  # Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-57823
+  # Verdict: Dangerzone is not affected. First things first, LibreOffice is
+  # using this library for parsing RDF metadata in a document [1], and has
+  # issued a fix for the vendored raptor2 package they have for other distros
+  # [2].
+  #
+  # On the other hand, the Debian security team has stated that this is a minor
+  # issue [3], and there's no fix from the developers yet. It seems that the
+  # Debian package is not affected somehow by this CVE, probably due to the way
+  # it's packaged.
+  #
+  # [1] https://wiki.documentfoundation.org/Documentation/DevGuide/Office_Development#RDF_metadata
+  # [2] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/libreoffice/core/commit/?id=2b50dc0e4482ac0ad27d69147b4175e05af4fba4
+  # [2] From https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-57823:
+  #
+  #       [bookworm] - raptor2 <postponed> (Minor issue, revisit when fixed upstream)
+  #
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2024-57823
--- a/BUILD.md
+++ b/BUILD.md
@ -515,3 +515,9 @@ poetry run .\install\windows\build-app.bat
 ```

 When you're done you will have `dist\Dangerzone.msi`.
+
+## Updating the container image
+
+The Dangezone container image is reproducible. This means that every time we
+build it, the result will be bit-for-bit the same, with some minor exceptions.
+Read more on how you can update it in `docs/developer/reproducibility.md`.
--- a/154
+++ b/154
@ -4,10 +4,10 @@

 ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE=20250113

-FROM debian:bookworm-${DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}-slim
+FROM debian:bookworm-${DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}-slim as dangerzone-image

-ARG GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250113
-ARG DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250120
+ARG GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250120
+ARG DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250127
 ARG H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM=7760dc2963332c50d15eee285933ec4b48d6a1de9e0c0f6082946f93090bd132
 ARG H2ORESTART_VERSION=v0.7.0

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ RUN \

 # Download H2ORestart from GitHub using a pinned version and hash. Note that
 # it's available in Debian repos, but not in Bookworm yet.
-RUN mkdir /libreoffice_ext && cd libreoffice_ext \
+RUN mkdir /opt/libreoffice_ext && cd /opt/libreoffice_ext \
    && H2ORESTART_FILENAME=h2orestart.oxt \
    && wget https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases/download/$H2ORESTART_VERSION/$H2ORESTART_FILENAME \
    && echo "$H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM  $H2ORESTART_FILENAME" | sha256sum -c \
@ -64,18 +64,148 @@ RUN touch /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/__init__.py
 # Copy only the Python code, and not any produced .pyc files.
 COPY conversion/*.py /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/conversion/

-# Let the entrypoint script write the OCI config for the inner container under
-# /config.json.
-RUN touch /config.json
-RUN chown dangerzone:dangerzone /config.json
-
-# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
-USER dangerzone
-
 # Create a directory that will be used by gVisor as the place where it will
 # store the state of its containers.
 RUN mkdir /home/dangerzone/.containers

+###############################################################################
+#
+#                       REUSING CONTAINER IMAGES:
+#                          Anatomy of a hack
+#                       ========================
+#
+# The rest of the Dockerfile aims to do one thing: allow the final container
+# image to actually contain two container images; one for the outer container
+# (spawned by Podman/Docker Desktop), and one for the inner container (spawned
+# by gVisor).
+#
+# This has already been done in the past, and we explain why and how in the
+# design document for gVisor integration (should be in
+# `docs/developer/gvisor.md`). In this iteration, we want to also
+# achieve the following:
+#
+# 1. Have a small final image, by sharing some system paths between the inner
+#    and outer container image using symlinks.
+# 2. Allow our security scanning tool to see the contents of the inner
+#    container image.
+# 3. Make the outer container image operational, in the sense that you can use
+#    `apt` commands and perform a conversion with Dangerzone, outside the
+#    gVisor sandbox. This is helpful for debugging purposes.
+#
+# Below we'll explain how our design choices are informed by the above
+# sub-goals.
+#
+# First, to achieve a small container image, we basically need to copy `/etc`,
+# `/usr` and `/opt` from the original Dangerzone image to the **inner**
+# container image (under `/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/`)
+#
+# That's all we need. The rest of the files play no role, and we can actually
+# mask them in gVisor's OCI config.
+#
+# Second, in order to let our security scanner find the installed packages,
+# we need to copy the following dirs to the root of the **outer** container
+# image:
+# * `/etc`, so that the security scanner can detect the image type and its
+#   sources
+# * `/var`, so that the security scanner can have access to the APT database.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: We don't symlink the `/etc` of the **outer** container image to
+# the **inner** one, in order to avoid leaking files like
+# `/etc/{hostname,hosts,resolv.conf}` that Podman/Docker mounts when running
+# the **outer** container image.
+#
+# Third, in order to have an operational Debian image, we are _mostly_ covered
+# by the dirs we have copied. There's a _rare_ case where during debugging, we
+# may want to install a system package that has components in `/etc` and
+# `/var`, which will not be available in the **inner** container image. In that
+# case, the developer can do the necessary symlinks in the live container.
+#
+#                           FILESYSTEM HIERARCHY
+#                           ====================
+#
+# The above plan leads to the following filesystem hierarchy:
+#
+# Outer container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 bin -> usr/bin
+#     -rwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    7764 Jan 24 08:14 entrypoint.py
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 etc
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 home
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       9 Jan 27 10:46 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 root
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 run
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       8 Jan 27 10:46 sbin -> usr/sbin
+#     drwxrwxrwx   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 tmp
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root      44 Jan 27 10:46 usr -> /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr
+#     drwxr-xr-x  11 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 var
+#
+# Inner container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/
+#     total 12
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 bin -> usr/bin
+#     drwxr-xr-x 43 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:46 etc
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Jan 27 10:47 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 opt
+#     drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 usr
+#
+#                           SYMLINKING /USR
+#                           ===============
+#
+# It's surprisingly difficult (maybe even borderline impossible), to symlink
+# `/usr` to a different path during image build. The problem is that /usr
+# is very sensitive, and you can't manipulate it in a live system. That is, I
+# haven't found a way to do the following, or something equivalent:
+#
+#    rm -r /usr && ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/ /usr
+#
+# The `ln` binary, even if you specify it by its full path, cannot run
+# (probably because `ld-linux.so` can't be found). For this reason, we have
+# to create the symlinks beforehand, in a previous build stage. Then, in an
+# empty contianer image (scratch images), we can copy these symlinks and the
+# /usr, and stich everything together.
+###############################################################################
+
+# Create the filesystem hierarchy that will be used to symlink /usr.
+
+RUN mkdir /new_root
+RUN mkdir /new_root/root /new_root/run /new_root/tmp
+RUN chmod 777 /new_root/tmp
+RUN ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr /new_root/usr
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /new_root/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /new_root/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /new_root/lib64
+RUN ln -s usr/sbin /new_root/sbin
+
+## Final image
+
+FROM scratch
+
+# Copy the filesystem hierarchy that we created in the previous stage, so that
+# /usr can be a symlink.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /new_root/ /
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to run Dangerzone in the inner container image.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /opt/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/opt/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /usr/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib64
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to let the security scanner find vulnerabilities.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /var/ /var/
+
+# Allow our entrypoint script to make changes in the following folders.
+RUN chown dangerzone:dangerzone /home/dangerzone /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/
+
+# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
+USER dangerzone
+
 COPY container_helpers/entrypoint.py /

 ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.py"]
--- a/Dockerfile.env
+++ b/Dockerfile.env
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Can be bumped to the latest date in https://hub.docker.com/_/debian/tags?name=bookworm-
+DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE=20250113
+# Can be bumped to today's date
+DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250127
+# Can be bumped to the latest date in https://github.com/google/gvisor/tags
+GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE=20250120
+# Can be bumped to the latest version and checksum from https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases
+H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM=7760dc2963332c50d15eee285933ec4b48d6a1de9e0c0f6082946f93090bd132
+H2ORESTART_VERSION=v0.7.0
--- a/Dockerfile.in
+++ b/Dockerfile.in
@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# NOTE: Updating the packages to their latest versions requires bumping the
+# Dockerfile args below. For more info about this file, read
+# docs/developer/reproducibility.md.
+
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE={{DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}}
+
+FROM debian:bookworm-${DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE}-slim as dangerzone-image
+
+ARG GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE={{GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE}}
+ARG DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE={{DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE}}
+ARG H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM={{H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM}}
+ARG H2ORESTART_VERSION={{H2ORESTART_VERSION}}
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+# The following way of installing packages is taken from
+# https://github.com/reproducible-containers/repro-sources-list.sh/blob/master/Dockerfile.debian-12,
+# and adapted to allow installing gVisor from each own repo as well.
+RUN \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/cache/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=cache,target=/var/lib/apt,sharing=locked \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/repro-sources-list.sh,target=/usr/local/bin/repro-sources-list.sh \
+  --mount=type=bind,source=./container_helpers/gvisor.key,target=/tmp/gvisor.key \
+  : "Hacky way to set a date for the Debian snapshot repos" && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources && \
+  touch -d ${DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE} /etc/apt/sources.list && \
+  repro-sources-list.sh && \
+  : "Setup APT to install gVisor from its separate APT repo" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get upgrade -y && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends apt-transport-https ca-certificates gnupg && \
+  gpg -o /usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg --dearmor /tmp/gvisor.key && \
+  echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases ${GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE} main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/gvisor.list && \
+  : "Install the necessary gVisor and Dangerzone dependencies" && \
+  apt-get update && \
+  apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      python3 python3-fitz libreoffice-nogui libreoffice-java-common \
+      python3 python3-magic default-jre-headless fonts-noto-cjk fonts-dejavu \
+      runsc unzip wget && \
+  : "Clean up for improving reproducibility (optional)" && \
+  rm -rf /var/cache/fontconfig/ && \
+  rm -rf /etc/ssl/certs/java/cacerts && \
+  rm -rf /var/log/* /var/cache/ldconfig/aux-cache
+
+# Download H2ORestart from GitHub using a pinned version and hash. Note that
+# it's available in Debian repos, but not in Bookworm yet.
+RUN mkdir /opt/libreoffice_ext && cd /opt/libreoffice_ext \
+    && H2ORESTART_FILENAME=h2orestart.oxt \
+    && wget https://github.com/ebandal/H2Orestart/releases/download/$H2ORESTART_VERSION/$H2ORESTART_FILENAME \
+    && echo "$H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM  $H2ORESTART_FILENAME" | sha256sum -c \
+    && install -dm777 "/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/" \
+    && rm /root/.wget-hsts
+
+# Create an unprivileged user both for gVisor and for running Dangerzone.
+RUN addgroup --gid 1000 dangerzone
+RUN adduser --uid 1000 --ingroup dangerzone --shell /bin/true \
+    --disabled-password --home /home/dangerzone dangerzone
+
+# Copy Dangerzone's conversion logic under /opt/dangerzone, and allow Python to
+# import it.
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone
+RUN touch /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/__init__.py
+
+# Copy only the Python code, and not any produced .pyc files.
+COPY conversion/*.py /opt/dangerzone/dangerzone/conversion/
+
+# Create a directory that will be used by gVisor as the place where it will
+# store the state of its containers.
+RUN mkdir /home/dangerzone/.containers
+
+###############################################################################
+#
+#                       REUSING CONTAINER IMAGES:
+#                          Anatomy of a hack
+#                       ========================
+#
+# The rest of the Dockerfile aims to do one thing: allow the final container
+# image to actually contain two container images; one for the outer container
+# (spawned by Podman/Docker Desktop), and one for the inner container (spawned
+# by gVisor).
+#
+# This has already been done in the past, and we explain why and how in the
+# design document for gVisor integration (should be in
+# `docs/developer/gvisor.md`). In this iteration, we want to also
+# achieve the following:
+#
+# 1. Have a small final image, by sharing some system paths between the inner
+#    and outer container image using symlinks.
+# 2. Allow our security scanning tool to see the contents of the inner
+#    container image.
+# 3. Make the outer container image operational, in the sense that you can use
+#    `apt` commands and perform a conversion with Dangerzone, outside the
+#    gVisor sandbox. This is helpful for debugging purposes.
+#
+# Below we'll explain how our design choices are informed by the above
+# sub-goals.
+#
+# First, to achieve a small container image, we basically need to copy `/etc`,
+# `/usr` and `/opt` from the original Dangerzone image to the **inner**
+# container image (under `/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/`)
+#
+# That's all we need. The rest of the files play no role, and we can actually
+# mask them in gVisor's OCI config.
+#
+# Second, in order to let our security scanner find the installed packages,
+# we need to copy the following dirs to the root of the **outer** container
+# image:
+# * `/etc`, so that the security scanner can detect the image type and its
+#   sources
+# * `/var`, so that the security scanner can have access to the APT database.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: We don't symlink the `/etc` of the **outer** container image to
+# the **inner** one, in order to avoid leaking files like
+# `/etc/{hostname,hosts,resolv.conf}` that Podman/Docker mounts when running
+# the **outer** container image.
+#
+# Third, in order to have an operational Debian image, we are _mostly_ covered
+# by the dirs we have copied. There's a _rare_ case where during debugging, we
+# may want to install a system package that has components in `/etc` and
+# `/var`, which will not be available in the **inner** container image. In that
+# case, the developer can do the necessary symlinks in the live container.
+#
+#                           FILESYSTEM HIERARCHY
+#                           ====================
+#
+# The above plan leads to the following filesystem hierarchy:
+#
+# Outer container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 bin -> usr/bin
+#     -rwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    7764 Jan 24 08:14 entrypoint.py
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 etc
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 home
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       7 Jan 27 10:46 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       9 Jan 27 10:46 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 root
+#     drwxr-xr-x   1 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 run
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root       8 Jan 27 10:46 sbin -> usr/sbin
+#     drwxrwxrwx   2 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:46 tmp
+#     lrwxrwxrwx   1 root   root      44 Jan 27 10:46 usr -> /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr
+#     drwxr-xr-x  11 root   root    4096 Jan 27 10:47 var
+#
+# Inner container image:
+#
+#     # ls -l /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/
+#     total 12
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 bin -> usr/bin
+#     drwxr-xr-x 43 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:46 etc
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    7 Jan 27 10:47 lib -> usr/lib
+#     lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Jan 27 10:47 lib64 -> usr/lib64
+#     drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 opt
+#     drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 Jan 27 10:47 usr
+#
+#                           SYMLINKING /USR
+#                           ===============
+#
+# It's surprisingly difficult (maybe even borderline impossible), to symlink
+# `/usr` to a different path during image build. The problem is that /usr
+# is very sensitive, and you can't manipulate it in a live system. That is, I
+# haven't found a way to do the following, or something equivalent:
+#
+#    rm -r /usr && ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/ /usr
+#
+# The `ln` binary, even if you specify it by its full path, cannot run
+# (probably because `ld-linux.so` can't be found). For this reason, we have
+# to create the symlinks beforehand, in a previous build stage. Then, in an
+# empty contianer image (scratch images), we can copy these symlinks and the
+# /usr, and stich everything together.
+###############################################################################
+
+# Create the filesystem hierarchy that will be used to symlink /usr.
+
+RUN mkdir /new_root
+RUN mkdir /new_root/root /new_root/run /new_root/tmp
+RUN chmod 777 /new_root/tmp
+RUN ln -s /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr /new_root/usr
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /new_root/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /new_root/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /new_root/lib64
+RUN ln -s usr/sbin /new_root/sbin
+
+## Final image
+
+FROM scratch
+
+# Copy the filesystem hierarchy that we created in the previous stage, so that
+# /usr can be a symlink.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /new_root/ /
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to run Dangerzone in the inner container image.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /opt/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/opt/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /usr/ /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/usr/
+RUN ln -s usr/bin /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/bin
+RUN ln -s usr/lib /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib
+RUN ln -s usr/lib64 /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/rootfs/lib64
+
+# Copy the bare minimum to let the security scanner find vulnerabilities.
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /etc/ /etc/
+COPY --from=dangerzone-image /var/ /var/
+
+# Allow our entrypoint script to make changes in the following folders.
+RUN chown dangerzone:dangerzone /home/dangerzone /home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/
+
+# Switch to the dangerzone user for the rest of the script.
+USER dangerzone
+
+COPY container_helpers/entrypoint.py /
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.py"]
--- a/3
+++ b/3
@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ test-large: test-large-init  ## Run large test set
 	python -m pytest --tb=no tests/test_large_set.py::TestLargeSet -v $(JUNIT_FLAGS) --junitxml=$(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)
 	python $(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)/report.py $(TEST_LARGE_RESULTS)

+Dockerfile: Dockerfile.env Dockerfile.in
+	poetry run jinja2 Dockerfile.in Dockerfile.env > Dockerfile
+
 .PHONY: build-clean
 build-clean:
 	doit clean
--- a/RELEASE.md
+++ b/RELEASE.md
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Here is a list of tasks that should be done before issuing the release:
 - [ ] Update the "Version" field in `install/linux/dangerzone.spec`
 - [ ] Bump the Debian version by adding a new changelog entry in `debian/changelog`
 - [ ] [Bump the minimum Docker Desktop versions](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/blob/main/RELEASE.md#bump-the-minimum-docker-desktop-version) in `isolation_provider/container.py`
+- [ ] Bump the dates and versions in the `Dockerfile`
 - [ ] Update screenshot in `README.md`, if necessary
 - [ ] CHANGELOG.md should be updated to include a list of all major changes since the last release
 - [ ] A draft release should be created. Copy the release notes text from the template at [`docs/templates/release-notes`](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/tree/main/docs/templates/)
--- a/dangerzone/container_helpers/entrypoint.py
+++ b/dangerzone/container_helpers/entrypoint.py
@ -56,13 +56,31 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
            {"type": "RLIMIT_NOFILE", "hard": 4096, "soft": 4096},
        ],
    },
-    "root": {"path": "/", "readonly": True},
+    "root": {"path": "rootfs", "readonly": True},
    "hostname": "dangerzone",
    "mounts": [
+        # Mask almost every system directory of the outer container, by mounting tmpfs
+        # on top of them. This is done to avoid leaking any sensitive information,
+        # either mounted by Podman/Docker, or when gVisor runs, since we reuse the same
+        # rootfs. We basically mask everything except for `/usr`, `/bin`, `/lib`,
+        # `/etc`, and `/opt`.
+        #
+        # Note that we set `--root /home/dangerzone/.containers` for the directory where
+        # gVisor will create files at runtime, which means that in principle, we are
+        # covered by the masking of `/home/dangerzone` that follows below.
+        #
+        # Finally, note that the following list has been taken from the dirs in our
+        # container image, and double-checked against the top-level dirs listed in the
+        # Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) [1]. It would be nice to have an allowlist
+        # approach instead of a denylist, but FHS is such an old standard that we don't
+        # expect any new top-level dirs to pop up any time soon.
+        #
+        # [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filesystem_Hierarchy_Standard
        {
-            "destination": "/proc",
-            "type": "proc",
-            "source": "proc",
+            "destination": "/boot",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
        },
        {
            "destination": "/dev",
@ -70,6 +88,53 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
            "source": "tmpfs",
            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/home",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/media",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/mnt",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/proc",
+            "type": "proc",
+            "source": "proc",
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/root",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/run",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/sbin",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/srv",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"],
+        },
        {
            "destination": "/sys",
            "type": "tmpfs",
@ -82,6 +147,12 @@ oci_config: dict[str, typing.Any] = {
            "source": "tmpfs",
            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
        },
+        {
+            "destination": "/var",
+            "type": "tmpfs",
+            "source": "tmpfs",
+            "options": ["nosuid", "noexec", "nodev"],
+        },
        # LibreOffice needs a writable home directory, so just mount a tmpfs
        # over it.
        {
@ -133,7 +204,7 @@ if os.environ.get("RUNSC_DEBUG"):
    json.dump(oci_config, sys.stderr, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
    # json.dump doesn't print a trailing newline, so print one here:
    log("")
-with open("/config.json", "w") as oci_config_out:
+with open("/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image/config.json", "w") as oci_config_out:
    json.dump(oci_config, oci_config_out, indent=2, sort_keys=True)

 # Run gVisor.
@ -150,7 +221,7 @@ if os.environ.get("RUNSC_DEBUG"):
    runsc_argv += ["--debug=true", "--alsologtostderr=true"]
 if os.environ.get("RUNSC_FLAGS"):
    runsc_argv += [x for x in shlex.split(os.environ.get("RUNSC_FLAGS", "")) if x]
-runsc_argv += ["run", "--bundle=/", "dangerzone"]
+runsc_argv += ["run", "--bundle=/home/dangerzone/dangerzone-image", "dangerzone"]
 log(
    "Running gVisor with command line: {}", " ".join(shlex.quote(s) for s in runsc_argv)
 )
--- a/dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py
+++ b/dangerzone/conversion/doc_to_pixels.py
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class DocumentToPixels(DangerzoneConverter):
            "unzip",
            "-d",
            f"/usr/lib/libreoffice/share/extensions/{libreoffice_ext}/",
-            f"/libreoffice_ext/{libreoffice_ext}",
+            f"/opt/libreoffice_ext/{libreoffice_ext}",
        ]
        await self.run_command(
            unzip_args,
--- a/dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
+++ b/dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py
@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import logging
+import pathlib
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+DIFFOCI_URL = "https://github.com/reproducible-containers/diffoci/releases/download/v0.1.5/diffoci-v0.1.5.linux-amd64"
+DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM = "01d25fe690196945a6bd510d30559338aa489c034d3a1b895a0d82a4b860698f"
+DIFFOCI_PATH = (
+    pathlib.Path.home() / ".local" / "share" / "dangerzone-dev" / "helpers" / "diffoci"
+)
+IMAGE_NAME = "dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone"
+
+
+def run(*args):
+    """Simple function that runs a command, validates it, and returns the output"""
+    logger.debug(f"Running command: {' '.join(args)}")
+    return subprocess.run(
+        args,
+        check=True,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+    ).stdout
+
+
+def git_commit_get():
+    return run("git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD").decode().strip()
+
+
+def git_determine_tag():
+    return run("git", "describe", "--long", "--first-parent").decode().strip()[1:]
+
+
+def git_verify(commit, source):
+    if not commit in source:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Image '{source}' does not seem to be built from commit '{commit}'"
+        )
+
+
+def diffoci_hash_matches(diffoci):
+    """Check if the hash of the downloaded diffoci bin matches the expected one."""
+    m = hashlib.sha256()
+    m.update(diffoci)
+    diffoci_checksum = m.hexdigest()
+    return diffoci_checksum == DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM
+
+
+def diffoci_is_installed():
+    """Determine if diffoci has been installed.
+
+    Determine if diffoci has been installed, by checking if the binary exists, and if
+    its hash is the expected one. If the binary exists but the hash is different, then
+    this is a sign that we need to update the local diffoci binary.
+    """
+    if not DIFFOCI_PATH.exists():
+        return False
+    return diffoci_hash_matches(DIFFOCI_PATH.open("rb").read())
+
+
+def diffoci_download():
+    """Download the diffoci tool, based on a URL and its checksum."""
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(DIFFOCI_URL) as f:
+        diffoci_bin = f.read()
+
+    if not diffoci_hash_matches(diffoci_bin):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Unexpected checksum for downloaded diffoci binary:"
+            f" {diffoci_checksum} !={DIFFOCI_CHECKSUM}"
+        )
+
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.open("wb+").write(diffoci_bin)
+    DIFFOCI_PATH.chmod(DIFFOCI_PATH.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)
+
+
+def diffoci_diff(source, local_target):
+    """Diff the source image against the recently built target image using diffoci."""
+    target = f"podman://{local_target}"
+    try:
+        return run(
+            str(DIFFOCI_PATH),
+            "diff",
+            source,
+            target,
+            "--semantic",
+            "--verbose",
+        )
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        error = e.stdout.decode()
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not rebuild an identical image to {source}. Diffoci report:\n{error}"
+        )
+
+
+def build_image(tag, use_cache=False):
+    """Build the Dangerzone container image with a special tag."""
+    run(
+        "python3",
+        "./install/common/build-image.py",
+        "--no-save",
+        "--use-cache",
+        str(use_cache),
+        "--tag",
+        tag,
+    )
+
+
+def parse_args():
+    image_tag = git_determine_tag()
+    # TODO: Remove the local "podman://" prefix once we have started pushing images to a
+    # remote.
+    default_image_name = f"podman://{IMAGE_NAME}:{image_tag}"
+
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog=sys.argv[0],
+        description="Dev script for verifying container image reproducibility",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--source",
+        default=default_image_name,
+        help=(
+            "The name of the image that you want to reproduce. If the image resides in"
+            " the local Docker / Podman engine, you can prefix it with podman:// or"
+            f" docker:// accordingly (default: {default_image_name})"
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--use-cache",
+        default=False,
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Whether to reuse the build cache (off by default for better reproducibility)",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main():
+    logging.basicConfig(
+        level=logging.DEBUG,
+        format="%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s",
+        datefmt="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
+    )
+    args = parse_args()
+
+    logger.info(f"Ensuring that current Git commit matches image '{args.source}'")
+    commit = git_commit_get()
+    git_verify(commit, args.source)
+
+    if not diffoci_is_installed():
+        logger.info(f"Downloading diffoci helper from {DIFFOCI_URL}")
+        diffoci_download()
+
+    tag = f"reproduce-{commit}"
+    target = f"{IMAGE_NAME}:{tag}"
+    logger.info(f"Building container image and tagging it as '{target}'")
+    build_image(tag, args.use_cache)
+
+    logger.info(
+        f"Ensuring that source image '{args.source}' is semantically identical with"
+        f" built image '{target}'"
+    )
+    try:
+        diffoci_diff(args.source, target)
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not reproduce image {args.source} for commit {commit}"
+        )
+        breakpoint()
+
+    logger.info(f"Successfully reproduced image '{args.source}' from commit '{commit}'")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
--- a/docs/developer/reproducibility.md
+++ b/docs/developer/reproducibility.md
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Reproducible builds
+
+We want to improve the transparency and auditability of our build artifacts, and
+a way to achieve this is via reproducible builds. For a broader understanding of
+what reproducible builds entail, check out https://reproducible-builds.org/.
+
+Our build artifacts consist of:
+* Container images (`amd64` and `arm64` architectures)
+* macOS installers (for Intel and Apple Silicon CPUs)
+* Windows installer
+* Fedora packages (for regular Fedora distros and Qubes)
+* Debian packages (for Debian and Ubuntu)
+
+As of writing this, only the following artifacts are reproducible:
+* Container images (see [#1047](https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/issues/1047))
+
+In the following sections, we'll mention some specifics about enforcing
+reproducibility for each artifact type.
+
+## Container image
+
+### Updating the image
+
+The fact that our image is reproducible also means that it's frozen in time.
+This means that rebuilding the image without updating our Dockerfile will
+**not** receive security updates.
+
+Here are the necessary variables that make up our image in the `Dockerfile.env`
+file:
+* `DEBIAN_IMAGE_DATE`: The date that the Debian container image was released
+* `DEBIAN_ARCHIVE_DATE`: The Debian snapshot repo that we want to use
+* `GVISOR_ARCHIVE_DATE`: The gVisor APT repo that we want to use
+* `H2ORESTART_CHECKSUM`: The SHA-256 checksum of the H2ORestart plugin
+* `H2ORESTART_VERSION`: The version of the H2ORestart plugin
+
+If you update these values in `Dockerfile.env`, you must also create a new
+Dockerfile with:
+
+```
+make Dockerfile
+```
+
+Updating `Dockerfile` without bumping `Dockerfile.in` is detected and should
+trigger a CI error.
+
+### Reproducing the image
+
+For a simple way to reproduce a Dangerzone container image, you can checkout the
+commit this image was built from (you can find it from the image tag in its
+`g<commit>` portion), and run the following command in a Linux environment:
+
+```
+./dev_scripts/reproduce-image.py --source <image>
+```
+
+This command will download the `diffoci` helper, build a container image from
+the current Git commit, and ensure that the built image matches the source one,
+with the exception of image names and file timestamps.
+
+> [!TIP]
+> If the source image is not pushed to a registry, and is local instead, you
+> can prefix it with `docker://` or `podman://` accordingly, so that `diffoci`
+> can load it from the local Docker / Podman container engine. For example:
+>
+> ```
+> ./dev_scripts/reproduce.py --source podman://dangerzone.rocks/dangerzone:0.8.0-125-g725ce3b
+> ```
--- a/install/common/build-image.py
+++ b/install/common/build-image.py
@ -27,6 +27,29 @@ def str2bool(v):
        raise argparse.ArgumentTypeError("Boolean value expected.")


+def determine_git_tag():
+    # Designate a unique tag for this image, depending on the Git commit it was created
+    # from:
+    # 1. If created from a Git tag (e.g., 0.8.0), the image tag will be `0.8.0`.
+    # 2. If created from a commit, it will be something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a`.
+    # 3. If the contents of the Git repo are dirty, we will append a unique identifier
+    #    for this run, something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a-fdcb` or `0.8.0-fdcb`.
+    dirty_ident = secrets.token_hex(2)
+    return (
+        subprocess.check_output(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "describe",
+                "--long",
+                "--first-parent",
+                f"--dirty=-{dirty_ident}",
+            ],
+        )
+        .decode()
+        .strip()[1:]  # remove the "v" prefix of the tag.
+    )
+
+
 def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument(
@ -55,6 +78,11 @@ def main():
        const=True,
        help="Use the builder's cache to speed up the builds",
    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--tag",
+        default=None,
+        help="Provide a custom tag for the image (for development only)",
+    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    tarball_path = Path("share") / "container.tar.gz"
@ -62,20 +90,7 @@ def main():

    print(f"Building for architecture '{ARCH}'")

-    # Designate a unique tag for this image, depending on the Git commit it was created
-    # from:
-    # 1. If created from a Git tag (e.g., 0.8.0), the image tag will be `0.8.0`.
-    # 2. If created from a commit, it will be something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a`.
-    # 3. If the contents of the Git repo are dirty, we will append a unique identifier
-    #    for this run, something like `0.8.0-31-g6bdaa7a-fdcb` or `0.8.0-fdcb`.
-    dirty_ident = secrets.token_hex(2)
-    tag = (
-        subprocess.check_output(
-            ["git", "describe", "--long", "--first-parent", f"--dirty=-{dirty_ident}"],
-        )
-        .decode()
-        .strip()[1:]  # remove the "v" prefix of the tag.
-    )
+    tag = args.tag or determine_git_tag()
    image_name_tagged = IMAGE_NAME + ":" + tag

    print(f"Will tag the container image as '{image_name_tagged}'")
--- a/install/linux/dangerzone.spec
+++ b/install/linux/dangerzone.spec
@ -216,16 +216,6 @@ convert the documents within a secure sandbox.
 %prep
 %autosetup -p1 -n dangerzone-%{version}

-# XXX: Bump the Python requirement in pyproject.toml from <3.13 to <3.14. Fedora
-# 41 comes with Python 3.13 installed, but our pyproject.toml does not support
-# it because PySide6 in PyPI works with Python 3.12 or earlier.
-#
-# This hack sidesteps this issue, and we haven't noticed any paticular problem
-# with the package that is built from that.
-%if 0%{?fedora} == 41
-sed -i 's/<3.13/<3.14/' pyproject.toml
-%endif
-
 # Bypass the version pin for Fedora as the 6.8.1.1 package is causing trouble
 # A 6.8.1.1 package was only released with a wheel for macOS, but was picked by
 # Fedora packagers. We cannot use "*" when PyPI is involved as it will fail to download the latest version.
--- a/poetry.lock
+++ b/poetry.lock
@ -874,9 +874,6 @@ optional = false
 python-versions = "<3.14,>=3.9"
 files = [
    {file = "PySide6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-macosx_12_0_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:805728a7ed58352a02689b953ddbe29af1c8944f8c7f2c28312dc0b69f64b85e"},
-    {file = "PySide6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:70f8c4745d981ebb5bb93d7b825222532d553373b68b9db7a42cfcee25cafc9a"},
-    {file = "PySide6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_39_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:de80ac62087a716b2bada2e3ddd739c5d176dc4be819abef91274d53d75f4e58"},
-    {file = "PySide6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:60a2551053fa69845b893fb821507e2cc89d3a8a8b43726d568acd1250ad44fb"},
 ]

 [package.dependencies]
@ -909,9 +906,6 @@ optional = false
 python-versions = "<3.14,>=3.9"
 files = [
    {file = "PySide6_Addons-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-macosx_12_0_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:83d35d7a1a7dbd1a16b4040a26ad4d5cc030a2aed4d439241babee1225d6e58a"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Addons-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:5ef45aeadca37d658e44a41e11f2b2e43dfc34c780a6be1cd09d96a7696e6cc6"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Addons-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_39_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:e1b4a20b0bcbc2e440faba62e0d164223b8fd6f041d749543bc3812979116c4c"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Addons-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:d8ae86944ac48cc9891666cf71565acebd403a953d0e050be4d41ac490788d0a"},
 ]

 [package.dependencies]
@ -942,9 +936,6 @@ optional = false
 python-versions = "<3.14,>=3.9"
 files = [
    {file = "PySide6_Essentials-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-macosx_12_0_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:25f3fdb281ac3b442f08250e3284d3b1944f7c64c62ed93b57678a62c199cf46"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Essentials-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:62b64842a91114c224c41eeb6a8c8f255ba60268bc5ac19724f944d60e2277c6"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Essentials-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_39_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:e0c1cc3cfb2ea5eea70748da7d22032a59ea641e24988f543d5b274c0adab065"},
-    {file = "PySide6_Essentials-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:085f12e16db31eb0e802b21c64eabf582f54db6c44463a1f5e1814d897b1f2c0"},
 ]

 [package.dependencies]
@ -1187,9 +1178,6 @@ optional = false
 python-versions = "<3.14,>=3.9"
 files = [
    {file = "shiboken6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-macosx_12_0_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:42fbb173a772c4e059dbeafb302e96f6ea8e1c9bacf05fab71ea7eb0d8f97b01"},
-    {file = "shiboken6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:d672df0f29dc5f44de7205c1acae4d0471ba8371bb1d68fdacbf1686f4d22a96"},
-    {file = "shiboken6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-manylinux_2_39_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:ff1b22a66476b042d3dc09870edca353fdac1c1f517a4cdc364b24e296213ecd"},
-    {file = "shiboken6-6.8.1.1-cp39-abi3-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:26f7041c77058a8ecfb9345caa187250b199de79cfb37e33936e5fbd468a7780"},
 ]

 [[package]]
@ -1388,5 +1376,5 @@ type = ["pytest-mypy"]

 [metadata]
 lock-version = "2.0"
-python-versions = ">=3.9,<3.13"
-content-hash = "9c77a647be7cd12ecb7e893ef3102554eb78faf761e99bafdb1d2424d6123c50"
+python-versions = ">=3.9,<3.14"
+content-hash = "c6395d63523761d272dfc5fe6eef7822a081b3b0fb0b739a82efec7de5346d57"
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ include = [
 ]

 [tool.poetry.dependencies]
-python = ">=3.9,<3.13"
+python = ">=3.9,<3.14"
 click = "*"
 platformdirs = "*"
 PySide6 = "^6.7.1"
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Alex Pyrgiotis	88a6b37770	Add support for Python 3.13 Some checks failed Scan latest app and container / security-scan-container (push) Has been cancelled Details Scan latest app and container / security-scan-app (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / windows (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (arch64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / macOS (x86_64) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / install-deb (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / build-install-rpm (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bookworm) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian bullseye) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (debian trixie) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 40) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (fedora 41) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 20.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 22.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.04) (push) Has been cancelled Details Tests / run tests (ubuntu 24.10) (push) Has been cancelled Details Bump our max supported Python version to 3.13, now that PySide6 supports it. Fixes #992	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	fb90243668	Symlink /usr in Debian container image Update our Dockerfile and entrypoint script in order to reuse the /usr dir in the inner and outer container image. Refs #1048	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	9724a16d81	Mask some extra paths in gVisor's OCI config Mask some paths of the outer container in the OCI config of the inner container. This is done to avoid leaking any sensitive information from Podman / Docker / gVisor, since we reuse the same rootfs Refs #1048	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cf43a7a0c4	docs: Add design document for artifact reproducibility Refs #1047	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cae4187550	Update RELEASE.md Co-authored-by: Alexis Métaireau <alexis@freedom.press>	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	cfa4478ace	ci: Add a CI job that enforces image reproducibility Add a CI job that uses the `reproduce.py` dev script to enforce image reproducibility, for every PR that we send to the repo. Fixes #1047	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	2557be9bc0	dev_scripts: Add script for enforcing image reproducibility Add a dev script for Linux platforms that verifies that a source image can be reproducibly built from the current Git commit. The reproducibility check is enforced by the `diffoci` tool, which is downloaded as part of running the script.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	235d71354a	Allow setting a tag for the container image Allow setting a tag for the container image, when building it with the `build-image.py` script. This should be used for development purposes only, since the proper image name should be dictated by the script.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	5d49f5abdb	ci: Scan the latest image for CVEs Update the Debian snapshot date to the current one, so that we always scan the latest image for CVEs. Refs #1057	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00
Alex Pyrgiotis	0ce7773ca1	Render the Dockerfile from a template and some params Allow updating the Dockerfile from a template and some envs, so that it's easier to bump the dates in it.	2025-01-27 21:40:27 +02:00